Signal
Submitted
Feb 1, 2026, 00:14 UTC
Thirteen EU member states call on the European Commission to act against deliberate GNSS interference, including jamming and spoofing primarily in Baltic Sea airspace, attributing hybrid attacks to Russia and Belarus.
Since 2022, 13 EU member states—including Baltic and Nordic countries and others such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands—have observed two types of GNSS interference, jamming and spoofing, disrupting civil aviation and maritime navigation in the Baltic Sea airspace. The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU responded with a joint letter outlining actions such as suspending radio resource rights to Russia and Belarus, enhancing EU and NATO civil-military cooperation for monitoring and response, intensifying radio frequency monitoring, deploying interference-resistant GNSS services with anti-spoofing features, developing resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services, and increasing diplomatic and legal pressure on responsible entities. The interference is seen as a systematic hybrid attack by Russia and Belarus on critical radio spectrum essential to modern transportation and security. Reported interference incidents have sharply increased in Lithuania (from 556 cases in March 2024 to 1185 in January 2025), Latvia (790 to 1288), Estonia (1150 to 1085), and Poland (1908 to 2732) during late 2024 and early 2025. The member states urge a coordinated EU-wide response to strengthen resilience and safeguard critical infrastructure.
Confidence: High
Classified as aggressor because the article attributes systematic, deliberate interference with GNSS signals to hostile action by Russia and Belarus targeting EU critical infrastructure; classified as defense preparation because it describes EU member states' coordinated calls for monitoring, resilience measures, deployment of interference-resistant technologies, and diplomatic/legal responses.
Source URL
https://gpsworld.com/13-eu-member-states-demand-action-on-gnss-interference
Source reliability
C
Info credibility
3
Event time
Jun 11, 2025, 21:06 UTC
Event time confidence
unknown
Location
Baltic Sea Region
Primary actor
Russia and Belarus
Country
Baltic Sea Region
Countries
Baltic Sea Region
Tags
GNSS interference, jamming, spoofing, Baltic Sea region, Russia, Belarus, hybrid warfare, civil aviation, maritime navigation, European Union, diplomatic pressure, anti-spoofing, radio frequency monitoring
Nodes
Node 1: Borders
Signal
Submitted
Feb 1, 2026, 00:14 UTC
Thirteen EU member states call on the European Commission to act against deliberate GNSS interference, including jamming and spoofing primarily in Baltic Sea airspace, attributing hybrid attacks to Russia and Belarus.
Since 2022, 13 EU member states—including Baltic and Nordic countries and others such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands—have observed two types of GNSS interference, jamming and spoofing, disrupting civil aviation and maritime navigation in the Baltic Sea airspace. The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU responded with a joint letter outlining actions such as suspending radio resource rights to Russia and Belarus, enhancing EU and NATO civil-military cooperation for monitoring and response, intensifying radio frequency monitoring, deploying interference-resistant GNSS services with anti-spoofing features, developing resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services, and increasing diplomatic and legal pressure on responsible entities. The interference is seen as a systematic hybrid attack by Russia and Belarus on critical radio spectrum essential to modern transportation and security. Reported interference incidents have sharply increased in Lithuania (from 556 cases in March 2024 to 1185 in January 2025), Latvia (790 to 1288), Estonia (1150 to 1085), and Poland (1908 to 2732) during late 2024 and early 2025. The member states urge a coordinated EU-wide response to strengthen resilience and safeguard critical infrastructure.
Confidence: High
Classified as aggressor because the article attributes systematic, deliberate interference with GNSS signals to hostile action by Russia and Belarus targeting EU critical infrastructure; classified as defense preparation because it describes EU member states' coordinated calls for monitoring, resilience measures, deployment of interference-resistant technologies, and diplomatic/legal responses.
Source URL
https://gpsworld.com/13-eu-member-states-demand-action-on-gnss-interference
Source reliability
C
Info credibility
3
Event time
Jun 11, 2025, 21:06 UTC
Event time confidence
unknown
Location
Baltic Sea Region
Primary actor
Russia and Belarus
Country
Baltic Sea Region
Countries
Baltic Sea Region
Tags
GNSS interference, jamming, spoofing, Baltic Sea region, Russia, Belarus, hybrid warfare, civil aviation, maritime navigation, European Union, diplomatic pressure, anti-spoofing, radio frequency monitoring
Nodes
Node 1: Borders