Persistent interference with GNSS signals originating from Russia, particularly its militarized bases in Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula, has intensified substantially over late 2025, impacting roughly 40% of European air traffic and encompassing the Nordic, Baltic, Arctic, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions. These jamming and spoofing operations constitute deliberate acts of aggression designed to jeopardize civilian and military aviation security, increase operational costs, and normalize insecurity short of declared war. Despite the threat, the United Nations remains ineffective in enforcement, NATO's response is limited, and the EU lacks a cohesive action plan despite calls from a coalition of 17 Transport Ministers. The European Policy Centre discussion paper authored by Maria Martisiute proposes 17 actionable measures including recognizing GNSS interference as a high political priority, adapting legal frameworks for accountability, expanding sanctions, enhancing EUROPOL’s mandate, and fostering strong cooperation with NATO. Technical and financial proposals include sharing EU Radio Frequency Interference monitoring with NATO, establishing a Central Hub for GNSS security including Ukraine, strengthening rapid response teams, and integrating electronic warfare capabilities into EU and national defense plans, with required public awareness campaigns. The paper emphasizes that without coordinated political and legal action, aviation communities face the burden of preventing potential catastrophic incidents.

Persistent interference with GNSS signals originating from Russia, particularly its militarized bases in Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula, has intensified substantially over late 2025, impacting roughly 40% of European air traffic and encompassing the Nordic, Baltic, Arctic, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions. These jamming and spoofing operations constitute deliberate acts of aggression designed to jeopardize civilian and military aviation security, increase operational costs, and normalize insecurity short of declared war. Despite the threat, the United Nations remains ineffective in enforcement, NATO's response is limited, and the EU lacks a cohesive action plan despite calls from a coalition of 17 Transport Ministers. The European Policy Centre discussion paper authored by Maria Martisiute proposes 17 actionable measures including recognizing GNSS interference as a high political priority, adapting legal frameworks for accountability, expanding sanctions, enhancing EUROPOL’s mandate, and fostering strong cooperation with NATO. Technical and financial proposals include sharing EU Radio Frequency Interference monitoring with NATO, establishing a Central Hub for GNSS security including Ukraine, strengthening rapid response teams, and integrating electronic warfare capabilities into EU and national defense plans, with required public awareness campaigns. The paper emphasizes that without coordinated political and legal action, aviation communities face the burden of preventing potential catastrophic incidents.