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Signal
Submitted
Apr 28, 2026, 13:45 UTC
From December 17, 2024 to January 14, 2025, Russia conducted an ongoing disinformation campaign in Germany targeting political parties ahead of the Bundestag election via fake 'doppelganger' accounts on platform X.
Between December 17, 2024 and January 14, 2025, Russian-controlled accounts launched a coordinated and sustained disinformation campaign targeting Germany's political parties on social media platform X. The so-called 'doppelganger' campaign created fake user profiles impersonating private users that promoted Kremlin-friendly narratives, including opposition to Ukraine aid and criticism of mainstream parties like the Greens, SPD, and CDU. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was rarely targeted and was portrayed positively. CeMAS documented 630 German-language posts reaching over 2.8 million views during that period, with suspiciously low likes but high shares, indicating coordination. The campaign employed fabricated news articles hosted on fake sites designed to resemble credible German media. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior and domestic intelligence have warned about such foreign influence operations. Social media platforms have taken measures to delete fake accounts, but often with delays allowing extensive dissemination. This ongoing disinformation effort seeks to sow doubt and anxiety about economic issues, energy supply, and border security in Germany, thereby influencing the political discourse before the 2025 Bundestag election.
Confidence: High
The article explicitly details a Russian state-linked disinformation campaign operating over a recent fixed timeframe, targeting German political parties with false narratives ahead of the Bundestag election, employing fake accounts and fabricated media, confirming hostile aggressor activity.
Source URL
https://tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/kontext/russland-doppelgaengerkampagne-100.html
Published as a hybrid-warfare signal with a public source and reviewer-approved assessment bands. See the methodology for how records are assessed.
{
"id": "249dc812-3ae1-44a0-bd88-7a7402ef001f",
"url": "https://tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/kontext/russland-doppelgaengerkampagne-100.html",
"source": "extension",
"status": "approved",
"category": "Cyber & Information Warfare",
"subcategory": "Information Operations",
"incident_type": "Propaganda & disinformation campaigns",
"country": "Germany",
"source_reliability": "A",
"info_credibility": "3",
"tags": [
"Russia",
"disinformation",
"doppelganger campaign",
"German Bundestag election",
"social media manipulation",
"platform X",
"CeMAS",
"pro-Kremlin narratives",
"fake accounts",
"political influence",
"Germany"
],
"nodes": [
"Node 2: 5th Column"
],
"countries": [
"Germany"
],
"where_text": "Cyberspace",
"headline": null,
"description": "Russian disinformation actors continued their long-running 'doppelganger' campaign from December 17, 2024 to January 14, 2025 on social media platform X targeting the German Bundestag election. The campaign used fake accounts impersonating private users to spread Kremlin-aligned narratives against parties like the Greens, SPD, and CDU, while rarely mentioning the AfD positively. CeMAS recorded 630 posts in that 1-month period with unusual interaction patterns: high share numbers but low likes and few followers, indicating coordinated manipulation. Links often led to fabricated news sites posing as credible German media outlets, spreading pro-Russian content including criticism of Germany's support for Ukraine and highlighting domestic economic fears. German authorities and intelligence agencies have identified and warned about over 50,000 such fake accounts since early 2024. Federal Interior Minister Nancy Faeser announced plans to pressure social media platforms to enforce laws against foreign electoral interference. The campaign aims to sow distrust and influence voter perceptions ahead of the 2025 Bundestag election.",
"summary_short": "From December 17, 2024 to January 14, 2025, Russia conducted an ongoing disinformation campaign in Germany targeting political parties ahead of the Bundestag election via fake 'doppelganger' accounts on platform X.",
"summary_extended": "Between December 17, 2024 and January 14, 2025, Russian-controlled accounts launched a coordinated and sustained disinformation campaign targeting Germany's political parties on social media platform X. The so-called 'doppelganger' campaign created fake user profiles impersonating private users that promoted Kremlin-friendly narratives, including opposition to Ukraine aid and criticism of mainstream parties like the Greens, SPD, and CDU. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was rarely targeted and was portrayed positively. CeMAS documented 630 German-language posts reaching over 2.8 million views during that period, with suspiciously low likes but high shares, indicating coordination. The campaign employed fabricated news articles hosted on fake sites designed to resemble credible German media. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior and domestic intelligence have warned about such foreign influence operations. Social media platforms have taken measures to delete fake accounts, but often with delays allowing extensive dissemination. This ongoing disinformation effort seeks to sow doubt and anxiety about economic issues, energy supply, and border security in Germany, thereby influencing the political discourse before the 2025 Bundestag election.",
"actor_primary": "Russian disinformation actors",
"target_primary": null,
"location_text": "Social media platform X (formerly Twitter)",
"location_region": null,
"location_coordinates_lat": 51.165691,
"location_coordinates_lon": 10.451526,
"location_precision": "Regional",
"is_aggressor_signal": true,
"signal_type": "HYBRID_SIGNAL",
"is_hybrid_war_signal": true,
"classification_complete": true,
"hybrid_signal_complete": true,
"classification_confidence": "High",
"classification_rationale": "The article explicitly details a Russian state-linked disinformation campaign operating over a recent fixed timeframe, targeting German political parties with false narratives ahead of the Bundestag election, employing fake accounts and fabricated media, confirming hostile aggressor activity.",
"event_time_utc": "2024-12-17T00:00:00.000Z",
"end_time_utc": "2025-01-14T23:59:59.000Z",
"event_time_confidence": "exact",
"created_at": "2026-04-28T13:45:00.860Z",
"updated_at": "2026-11-10T02:40:40.162Z",
"reliability_band": "strong",
"location_precision_band": "regional",
"time_precision_band": "exact",
"severity_band": "significant",
"attribution_confidence_band": "high",
"attribution_basis": "single_source"
}Source reliability
A
Info credibility
3
Event time
Dec 17, 2024, 00:00 UTC
End time
Jan 14, 2025, 23:59 UTC
Event time confidence
exact
Location
Social media platform X (formerly Twitter)
Primary actor
Russian disinformation actors
Country
Germany
Countries
Germany
Tags
Russia, disinformation, doppelganger campaign, German Bundestag election, social media manipulation, platform X, CeMAS, pro-Kremlin narratives, fake accounts, political influence, Germany
Nodes
Node 2: 5th Column
Signal
Submitted
Apr 28, 2026, 13:45 UTC
From December 17, 2024 to January 14, 2025, Russia conducted an ongoing disinformation campaign in Germany targeting political parties ahead of the Bundestag election via fake 'doppelganger' accounts on platform X.
Between December 17, 2024 and January 14, 2025, Russian-controlled accounts launched a coordinated and sustained disinformation campaign targeting Germany's political parties on social media platform X. The so-called 'doppelganger' campaign created fake user profiles impersonating private users that promoted Kremlin-friendly narratives, including opposition to Ukraine aid and criticism of mainstream parties like the Greens, SPD, and CDU. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was rarely targeted and was portrayed positively. CeMAS documented 630 German-language posts reaching over 2.8 million views during that period, with suspiciously low likes but high shares, indicating coordination. The campaign employed fabricated news articles hosted on fake sites designed to resemble credible German media. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior and domestic intelligence have warned about such foreign influence operations. Social media platforms have taken measures to delete fake accounts, but often with delays allowing extensive dissemination. This ongoing disinformation effort seeks to sow doubt and anxiety about economic issues, energy supply, and border security in Germany, thereby influencing the political discourse before the 2025 Bundestag election.
Confidence: High
The article explicitly details a Russian state-linked disinformation campaign operating over a recent fixed timeframe, targeting German political parties with false narratives ahead of the Bundestag election, employing fake accounts and fabricated media, confirming hostile aggressor activity.
Source URL
https://tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/kontext/russland-doppelgaengerkampagne-100.html
Published as a hybrid-warfare signal with a public source and reviewer-approved assessment bands. See the methodology for how records are assessed.
{
"id": "249dc812-3ae1-44a0-bd88-7a7402ef001f",
"url": "https://tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/kontext/russland-doppelgaengerkampagne-100.html",
"source": "extension",
"status": "approved",
"category": "Cyber & Information Warfare",
"subcategory": "Information Operations",
"incident_type": "Propaganda & disinformation campaigns",
"country": "Germany",
"source_reliability": "A",
"info_credibility": "3",
"tags": [
"Russia",
"disinformation",
"doppelganger campaign",
"German Bundestag election",
"social media manipulation",
"platform X",
"CeMAS",
"pro-Kremlin narratives",
"fake accounts",
"political influence",
"Germany"
],
"nodes": [
"Node 2: 5th Column"
],
"countries": [
"Germany"
],
"where_text": "Cyberspace",
"headline": null,
"description": "Russian disinformation actors continued their long-running 'doppelganger' campaign from December 17, 2024 to January 14, 2025 on social media platform X targeting the German Bundestag election. The campaign used fake accounts impersonating private users to spread Kremlin-aligned narratives against parties like the Greens, SPD, and CDU, while rarely mentioning the AfD positively. CeMAS recorded 630 posts in that 1-month period with unusual interaction patterns: high share numbers but low likes and few followers, indicating coordinated manipulation. Links often led to fabricated news sites posing as credible German media outlets, spreading pro-Russian content including criticism of Germany's support for Ukraine and highlighting domestic economic fears. German authorities and intelligence agencies have identified and warned about over 50,000 such fake accounts since early 2024. Federal Interior Minister Nancy Faeser announced plans to pressure social media platforms to enforce laws against foreign electoral interference. The campaign aims to sow distrust and influence voter perceptions ahead of the 2025 Bundestag election.",
"summary_short": "From December 17, 2024 to January 14, 2025, Russia conducted an ongoing disinformation campaign in Germany targeting political parties ahead of the Bundestag election via fake 'doppelganger' accounts on platform X.",
"summary_extended": "Between December 17, 2024 and January 14, 2025, Russian-controlled accounts launched a coordinated and sustained disinformation campaign targeting Germany's political parties on social media platform X. The so-called 'doppelganger' campaign created fake user profiles impersonating private users that promoted Kremlin-friendly narratives, including opposition to Ukraine aid and criticism of mainstream parties like the Greens, SPD, and CDU. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was rarely targeted and was portrayed positively. CeMAS documented 630 German-language posts reaching over 2.8 million views during that period, with suspiciously low likes but high shares, indicating coordination. The campaign employed fabricated news articles hosted on fake sites designed to resemble credible German media. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior and domestic intelligence have warned about such foreign influence operations. Social media platforms have taken measures to delete fake accounts, but often with delays allowing extensive dissemination. This ongoing disinformation effort seeks to sow doubt and anxiety about economic issues, energy supply, and border security in Germany, thereby influencing the political discourse before the 2025 Bundestag election.",
"actor_primary": "Russian disinformation actors",
"target_primary": null,
"location_text": "Social media platform X (formerly Twitter)",
"location_region": null,
"location_coordinates_lat": 51.165691,
"location_coordinates_lon": 10.451526,
"location_precision": "Regional",
"is_aggressor_signal": true,
"signal_type": "HYBRID_SIGNAL",
"is_hybrid_war_signal": true,
"classification_complete": true,
"hybrid_signal_complete": true,
"classification_confidence": "High",
"classification_rationale": "The article explicitly details a Russian state-linked disinformation campaign operating over a recent fixed timeframe, targeting German political parties with false narratives ahead of the Bundestag election, employing fake accounts and fabricated media, confirming hostile aggressor activity.",
"event_time_utc": "2024-12-17T00:00:00.000Z",
"end_time_utc": "2025-01-14T23:59:59.000Z",
"event_time_confidence": "exact",
"created_at": "2026-04-28T13:45:00.860Z",
"updated_at": "2026-11-10T02:40:40.162Z",
"reliability_band": "strong",
"location_precision_band": "regional",
"time_precision_band": "exact",
"severity_band": "significant",
"attribution_confidence_band": "high",
"attribution_basis": "single_source"
}Source reliability
A
Info credibility
3
Event time
Dec 17, 2024, 00:00 UTC
End time
Jan 14, 2025, 23:59 UTC
Event time confidence
exact
Location
Social media platform X (formerly Twitter)
Primary actor
Russian disinformation actors
Country
Germany
Countries
Germany
Tags
Russia, disinformation, doppelganger campaign, German Bundestag election, social media manipulation, platform X, CeMAS, pro-Kremlin narratives, fake accounts, political influence, Germany
Nodes
Node 2: 5th Column