Signal
Submitted
Feb 14, 2026, 12:22 UTC
Kaliningrad GPS/GNSS jammer, active continuously since early September 2024, was turned off on September 30, marking a new pattern since April.
Since April 2024, the Russian GPS/GNSS jammer located in Kaliningrad operated typically during nighttime hours. However, starting the first week of September, it shifted to a continuous 24/7 operation, presumably due to increased perceived threats like drone attacks or to disrupt Western aviation. On September 30, 2024, at 13:00 UTC, the jammer was likely completely turned off, marking a significant change in its operation pattern. Observations were limited during nighttime, but the shift from constant jamming is a new development. This information is derived from signal observations and monitoring detailed by open-source analyst @auonsson.
Confidence: High
The event clearly describes Russian hostile use of GPS jamming technology targeting Western navigation and aircraft in the Kaliningrad region, evidencing aggressor activity. No defensive or allied preparatory actions are described.
Source URL
https://x.com/i/web/status/1841402748354417089
Published as a hybrid-warfare signal with a public source and reviewer-approved assessment bands. See the methodology for how records are assessed.
{
"id": "28b7624c-17ee-4a37-9910-6bd98a1089e5",
"url": "https://x.com/i/web/status/1841402748354417089",
"source": "csv-import",
"status": "approved",
"category": "Cyber & Information Warfare",
"subcategory": "Unknown",
"incident_type": "Unknown",
"country": "Russian Federation",
"source_reliability": "C",
"info_credibility": "3",
"tags": [
"Kaliningrad",
"GPS jamming",
"Russian electronic warfare",
"SIGINT",
"GNSS disruption",
"Baltic security",
"Drone threat countermeasures"
],
"nodes": [],
"countries": [],
"where_text": "Land",
"headline": null,
"description": "The Kaliningrad-based Russian GPS/GNSS jammer, which had been operating continuously 24/7 since the start of September 2024 after years of mainly night-time operation, was observed to be likely completely turned off at 13:00 UTC on September 30, 2024. This represents a notable operational change, as prior to April 2024 the device was only active during nights routinely. The 24/7 jamming was presumably to counter increased threat perceptions, such as drone attacks, or to cause maximum disruption to Western aviation. Observations were limited during nights, but this pattern shift is confirmed by signal jamming data. This event highlights changes in Russian electronic warfare posture in the strategically sensitive Kaliningrad region.",
"summary_short": "Kaliningrad GPS/GNSS jammer, active continuously since early September 2024, was turned off on September 30, marking a new pattern since April.",
"summary_extended": "Since April 2024, the Russian GPS/GNSS jammer located in Kaliningrad operated typically during nighttime hours. However, starting the first week of September, it shifted to a continuous 24/7 operation, presumably due to increased perceived threats like drone attacks or to disrupt Western aviation. On September 30, 2024, at 13:00 UTC, the jammer was likely completely turned off, marking a significant change in its operation pattern. Observations were limited during nighttime, but the shift from constant jamming is a new development. This information is derived from signal observations and monitoring detailed by open-source analyst @auonsson.",
"actor_primary": "Kaliningrad-based Russian GPS/GNSS jammer operator",
"target_primary": null,
"location_text": "Kaliningrad",
"location_region": "Kaliningrad Oblast",
"location_coordinates_lat": 54.7104,
"location_coordinates_lon": 20.4522,
"location_precision": "Approximate",
"is_aggressor_signal": true,
"signal_type": "HYBRID_SIGNAL",
"is_hybrid_war_signal": true,
"classification_complete": true,
"hybrid_signal_complete": true,
"classification_confidence": "High",
"classification_rationale": "The event clearly describes Russian hostile use of GPS jamming technology targeting Western navigation and aircraft in the Kaliningrad region, evidencing aggressor activity. No defensive or allied preparatory actions are described.",
"event_time_utc": "2024-09-30T13:00:00.000Z",
"end_time_utc": null,
"event_time_confidence": "exact",
"created_at": "2026-02-14T12:22:49.220Z",
"updated_at": "2026-11-08T20:35:24.663Z",
"reliability_band": "strong",
"location_precision_band": "approximate",
"time_precision_band": "exact",
"severity_band": "minor",
"attribution_confidence_band": "medium",
"attribution_basis": "single_source"
}Source reliability
C
Info credibility
3
Event time
Sep 30, 2024, 13:00 UTC
Event time confidence
exact
Location
Kaliningrad
Region
Kaliningrad Oblast
Primary actor
Kaliningrad-based Russian GPS/GNSS jammer operator
Country
Russian Federation
Tags
Kaliningrad, GPS jamming, Russian electronic warfare, SIGINT, GNSS disruption, Baltic security, Drone threat countermeasures
Signal
Submitted
Feb 14, 2026, 12:22 UTC
Kaliningrad GPS/GNSS jammer, active continuously since early September 2024, was turned off on September 30, marking a new pattern since April.
Since April 2024, the Russian GPS/GNSS jammer located in Kaliningrad operated typically during nighttime hours. However, starting the first week of September, it shifted to a continuous 24/7 operation, presumably due to increased perceived threats like drone attacks or to disrupt Western aviation. On September 30, 2024, at 13:00 UTC, the jammer was likely completely turned off, marking a significant change in its operation pattern. Observations were limited during nighttime, but the shift from constant jamming is a new development. This information is derived from signal observations and monitoring detailed by open-source analyst @auonsson.
Confidence: High
The event clearly describes Russian hostile use of GPS jamming technology targeting Western navigation and aircraft in the Kaliningrad region, evidencing aggressor activity. No defensive or allied preparatory actions are described.
Source URL
https://x.com/i/web/status/1841402748354417089
Published as a hybrid-warfare signal with a public source and reviewer-approved assessment bands. See the methodology for how records are assessed.
{
"id": "28b7624c-17ee-4a37-9910-6bd98a1089e5",
"url": "https://x.com/i/web/status/1841402748354417089",
"source": "csv-import",
"status": "approved",
"category": "Cyber & Information Warfare",
"subcategory": "Unknown",
"incident_type": "Unknown",
"country": "Russian Federation",
"source_reliability": "C",
"info_credibility": "3",
"tags": [
"Kaliningrad",
"GPS jamming",
"Russian electronic warfare",
"SIGINT",
"GNSS disruption",
"Baltic security",
"Drone threat countermeasures"
],
"nodes": [],
"countries": [],
"where_text": "Land",
"headline": null,
"description": "The Kaliningrad-based Russian GPS/GNSS jammer, which had been operating continuously 24/7 since the start of September 2024 after years of mainly night-time operation, was observed to be likely completely turned off at 13:00 UTC on September 30, 2024. This represents a notable operational change, as prior to April 2024 the device was only active during nights routinely. The 24/7 jamming was presumably to counter increased threat perceptions, such as drone attacks, or to cause maximum disruption to Western aviation. Observations were limited during nights, but this pattern shift is confirmed by signal jamming data. This event highlights changes in Russian electronic warfare posture in the strategically sensitive Kaliningrad region.",
"summary_short": "Kaliningrad GPS/GNSS jammer, active continuously since early September 2024, was turned off on September 30, marking a new pattern since April.",
"summary_extended": "Since April 2024, the Russian GPS/GNSS jammer located in Kaliningrad operated typically during nighttime hours. However, starting the first week of September, it shifted to a continuous 24/7 operation, presumably due to increased perceived threats like drone attacks or to disrupt Western aviation. On September 30, 2024, at 13:00 UTC, the jammer was likely completely turned off, marking a significant change in its operation pattern. Observations were limited during nighttime, but the shift from constant jamming is a new development. This information is derived from signal observations and monitoring detailed by open-source analyst @auonsson.",
"actor_primary": "Kaliningrad-based Russian GPS/GNSS jammer operator",
"target_primary": null,
"location_text": "Kaliningrad",
"location_region": "Kaliningrad Oblast",
"location_coordinates_lat": 54.7104,
"location_coordinates_lon": 20.4522,
"location_precision": "Approximate",
"is_aggressor_signal": true,
"signal_type": "HYBRID_SIGNAL",
"is_hybrid_war_signal": true,
"classification_complete": true,
"hybrid_signal_complete": true,
"classification_confidence": "High",
"classification_rationale": "The event clearly describes Russian hostile use of GPS jamming technology targeting Western navigation and aircraft in the Kaliningrad region, evidencing aggressor activity. No defensive or allied preparatory actions are described.",
"event_time_utc": "2024-09-30T13:00:00.000Z",
"end_time_utc": null,
"event_time_confidence": "exact",
"created_at": "2026-02-14T12:22:49.220Z",
"updated_at": "2026-11-08T20:35:24.663Z",
"reliability_band": "strong",
"location_precision_band": "approximate",
"time_precision_band": "exact",
"severity_band": "minor",
"attribution_confidence_band": "medium",
"attribution_basis": "single_source"
}Source reliability
C
Info credibility
3
Event time
Sep 30, 2024, 13:00 UTC
Event time confidence
exact
Location
Kaliningrad
Region
Kaliningrad Oblast
Primary actor
Kaliningrad-based Russian GPS/GNSS jammer operator
Country
Russian Federation
Tags
Kaliningrad, GPS jamming, Russian electronic warfare, SIGINT, GNSS disruption, Baltic security, Drone threat countermeasures