Signal
Submitted
Jun 13, 2026, 23:24 UTC
Detection of radar jammers around Ukraine and Kaliningrad using satellite data and interference bearings method.
A method described by Sean Gorman and implemented by user @auonsson uses jammers' interference detected by radar bearings to compute center positions and uncertainties of jammers. The analysis identified several likely radar jammers around Ukraine and Kaliningrad by combining bearings over multiple satellite passes. Calibration against a known jammer near Shiraz, Iran, showed a positional error of 2.5 km. Detection thresholds were raised to reduce false positives. Data used were from NISAR satellite beta imagery, last collected in January 2026, with limited coverage and lacking optimal perpendicular passes. The method relies on large data files (14GB each), and Google Earth KML files were created for visualization. Although exact position accuracy over the Baltics is uncertain, detections near Kaliningrad were reported with a CEP (Circular Error Probable) of 95 meters plus 50 meters.
Confidence: Medium
The detection of active radar jammers in proximity to Ukraine and Kaliningrad suggests hostile signals potentially related to hybrid warfare, as such jammers disrupt military and surveillance radars. The data and methods confirm presence of jamming devices consistent with aggressor tactics, though precision and coverage limitations reduce absolute certainty.
Source URL
https://x.com/i/web/status/2065824619727106166
Source reliability
C
Info credibility
3
Event time
Jan 1, 2026, 00:00 UTC
Event time confidence
unknown
Location
Kaliningrad
Region
Kaliningrad Oblast
Country
Russian Federation
Countries
Russian Federation
Tags
radar jammer, SIGINT, satellite imagery, Kaliningrad, Ukraine, NISAR, jamming detection
Signal
Submitted
Jun 13, 2026, 23:24 UTC
Detection of radar jammers around Ukraine and Kaliningrad using satellite data and interference bearings method.
A method described by Sean Gorman and implemented by user @auonsson uses jammers' interference detected by radar bearings to compute center positions and uncertainties of jammers. The analysis identified several likely radar jammers around Ukraine and Kaliningrad by combining bearings over multiple satellite passes. Calibration against a known jammer near Shiraz, Iran, showed a positional error of 2.5 km. Detection thresholds were raised to reduce false positives. Data used were from NISAR satellite beta imagery, last collected in January 2026, with limited coverage and lacking optimal perpendicular passes. The method relies on large data files (14GB each), and Google Earth KML files were created for visualization. Although exact position accuracy over the Baltics is uncertain, detections near Kaliningrad were reported with a CEP (Circular Error Probable) of 95 meters plus 50 meters.
Confidence: Medium
The detection of active radar jammers in proximity to Ukraine and Kaliningrad suggests hostile signals potentially related to hybrid warfare, as such jammers disrupt military and surveillance radars. The data and methods confirm presence of jamming devices consistent with aggressor tactics, though precision and coverage limitations reduce absolute certainty.
Source URL
https://x.com/i/web/status/2065824619727106166
Source reliability
C
Info credibility
3
Event time
Jan 1, 2026, 00:00 UTC
Event time confidence
unknown
Location
Kaliningrad
Region
Kaliningrad Oblast
Country
Russian Federation
Countries
Russian Federation
Tags
radar jammer, SIGINT, satellite imagery, Kaliningrad, Ukraine, NISAR, jamming detection