Investigative report reveals that Polish-registered transport companies controlled by Russian and Belarusian nationals, including a logistics network linked to Russian millionaire Vasily Smetanin, are operating in Poland and the EU, evading sanctions imposed due to Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine and Belarus' role. The network includes companies like DSPL and Azonik, using complex ownership structures involving Austrian holding Albereta GmbH, Kazakh firm Technobel LLP, and others. Despite EU and Polish sanctions prohibiting Belarusian and Russian carriers from operating in the EU, these companies use transshipment, trailer-swapping, and front companies to continue freight operations, including sanctioned goods and medicines sent from Sweden to Russia through Poland. Polish authorities, including the Chief Road Transport Inspectorate, acknowledge monitoring Russian or Belarusian ownership but do not publicize investigations. A recent law since 2025 criminalizes schemes evading sanctions, and after media exposure AstraZeneca stopped using implicated carriers. The investigation uncovered connections between companies, key individuals (Vasily Smetanin, Anastasia Bulavina, Nikoloz Geguchadze, Julia Chechet), and corporate ownerships, showing deliberate sanction evasion via layered entities. One example is a 2026 Swedish trucking accident involving a vehicle registered in Poland with Belarusian and Kazakh links, used to transport medicine destined for Russia. The report highlights systemic gaps in enforcement and the sophisticated methods used by Russian-linked entities to maintain logistics operations in the EU.

Investigative report reveals that Polish-registered transport companies controlled by Russian and Belarusian nationals, including a logistics network linked to Russian millionaire Vasily Smetanin, are operating in Poland and the EU, evading sanctions imposed due to Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine and Belarus' role. The network includes companies like DSPL and Azonik, using complex ownership structures involving Austrian holding Albereta GmbH, Kazakh firm Technobel LLP, and others. Despite EU and Polish sanctions prohibiting Belarusian and Russian carriers from operating in the EU, these companies use transshipment, trailer-swapping, and front companies to continue freight operations, including sanctioned goods and medicines sent from Sweden to Russia through Poland. Polish authorities, including the Chief Road Transport Inspectorate, acknowledge monitoring Russian or Belarusian ownership but do not publicize investigations. A recent law since 2025 criminalizes schemes evading sanctions, and after media exposure AstraZeneca stopped using implicated carriers. The investigation uncovered connections between companies, key individuals (Vasily Smetanin, Anastasia Bulavina, Nikoloz Geguchadze, Julia Chechet), and corporate ownerships, showing deliberate sanction evasion via layered entities. One example is a 2026 Swedish trucking accident involving a vehicle registered in Poland with Belarusian and Kazakh links, used to transport medicine destined for Russia. The report highlights systemic gaps in enforcement and the sophisticated methods used by Russian-linked entities to maintain logistics operations in the EU.