Before the Latvian Saeima elections, Kremlin-affiliated channels actively encouraged people not to vote. Researchers from the Eastern Europe Policy Research Center and the DisInt.ai monitoring project studied Kremlin narratives over three months. They found that disinformation claims about election illegitimacy quadrupled compared to earlier elections. Kremlin messaging adapted to the election context, emphasizing narratives that Latvia cannot exist without Russia, is not sovereign, persecutes Russian speakers, provokes war, and glorifies Nazism. These narratives were framed as potential election outcomes if Kremlin-unfavorable parties win. The Kremlin channel network core includes about a dozen Telegram channels frequently reposting each other's content. Notably, 'Grani Svoboda', a Belarus-based account run by Roman Samuls and Andrejs Mamikins, was highly active generating Kremlin-supportive content in both Russian and Latvian, contradicting assumptions about language-based audience segregation. While Kremlin messaging was coordinated, distributors’ actions were inconsistent. For example, a sanctioned pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politician openly campaigned through TikTok supporting a candidate, the most direct foreign election interference found. Meanwhile, other channels spread opposing information about that candidate, e.g., claims he complained to Latvia’s State Security Service about pro-Kremlin blogger Roman Samuls. The primary goal of Kremlin narratives was to lower voter turnout rather than target specific parties or politicians. Post-election, the narratives stressed low turnout, delays in vote counting, and poll results as proof the election was pre-decided. Researchers consider Kremlin efforts unlikely to have strongly impacted the record low turnout. Importantly, Kremlin disinformation increasingly builds on true facts combined with emotionally charged Kremlin-favorable framing. Similar Kremlin influence campaigns have been documented in recent elections in Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia.

Before the Latvian Saeima elections, Kremlin-affiliated channels actively encouraged people not to vote. Researchers from the Eastern Europe Policy Research Center and the DisInt.ai monitoring project studied Kremlin narratives over three months. They found that disinformation claims about election illegitimacy quadrupled compared to earlier elections. Kremlin messaging adapted to the election context, emphasizing narratives that Latvia cannot exist without Russia, is not sovereign, persecutes Russian speakers, provokes war, and glorifies Nazism. These narratives were framed as potential election outcomes if Kremlin-unfavorable parties win. The Kremlin channel network core includes about a dozen Telegram channels frequently reposting each other's content. Notably, 'Grani Svoboda', a Belarus-based account run by Roman Samuls and Andrejs Mamikins, was highly active generating Kremlin-supportive content in both Russian and Latvian, contradicting assumptions about language-based audience segregation. While Kremlin messaging was coordinated, distributors’ actions were inconsistent. For example, a sanctioned pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politician openly campaigned through TikTok supporting a candidate, the most direct foreign election interference found. Meanwhile, other channels spread opposing information about that candidate, e.g., claims he complained to Latvia’s State Security Service about pro-Kremlin blogger Roman Samuls. The primary goal of Kremlin narratives was to lower voter turnout rather than target specific parties or politicians. Post-election, the narratives stressed low turnout, delays in vote counting, and poll results as proof the election was pre-decided. Researchers consider Kremlin efforts unlikely to have strongly impacted the record low turnout. Importantly, Kremlin disinformation increasingly builds on true facts combined with emotionally charged Kremlin-favorable framing. Similar Kremlin influence campaigns have been documented in recent elections in Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia.