Lithuania’s State Security Department (VSD) announced that three Ukrainian citizens have been expelled from Lithuania after being accused of performing paid assignments for unspecified “hostile” foreign intelligence services. The three had previously been formally classified as threats to national security, leading to the revocation of their temporary residence permits. According to VSD’s public statement, they undertook a wide range of tasks for the foreign services in exchange for money, with tasking and communication conducted via Telegram and other messaging applications. The individuals have been barred from returning to Lithuania for five years. VSD used the case to warn that foreign intelligence services increasingly exploit messaging apps and social media to recruit agents abroad because such methods are cheap, scalable, and shift operational risk onto recruited individuals, with intelligence officers avoiding responsibility for the agents’ safety or legal consequences. The report fits into a broader pattern of Lithuanian counterintelligence actions against suspected foreign operatives and networks, including earlier moves against Belarusian tech workers and tightening of visa and migration controls, and highlights ongoing hostile intelligence interest in Lithuania within a hybrid-warfare context.

Lithuania’s State Security Department (VSD) announced that three Ukrainian citizens have been expelled from Lithuania after being accused of performing paid assignments for unspecified “hostile” foreign intelligence services. The three had previously been formally classified as threats to national security, leading to the revocation of their temporary residence permits. According to VSD’s public statement, they undertook a wide range of tasks for the foreign services in exchange for money, with tasking and communication conducted via Telegram and other messaging applications. The individuals have been barred from returning to Lithuania for five years. VSD used the case to warn that foreign intelligence services increasingly exploit messaging apps and social media to recruit agents abroad because such methods are cheap, scalable, and shift operational risk onto recruited individuals, with intelligence officers avoiding responsibility for the agents’ safety or legal consequences. The report fits into a broader pattern of Lithuanian counterintelligence actions against suspected foreign operatives and networks, including earlier moves against Belarusian tech workers and tightening of visa and migration controls, and highlights ongoing hostile intelligence interest in Lithuania within a hybrid-warfare context.