The article analyzes lessons from the war in Ukraine relevant to Baltic defense, focusing on command structures and warfighting functions. Retired Estonian generals Martin Herem and Veiko-Vello Palm emphasize the need for Baltic states to strengthen divisional command, targeting processes, and capabilities to disrupt enemy command and control. They stress adaptation, rapid capability integration, and willingness to change as crucial. Ukraine's shift to a corps-based operational command level, mission command philosophy, and the importance of training reservists with active-duty procedures and systems are highlighted. The article compares Ukraine’s more user-friendly and rapid command-and-control systems with NATO’s highly secure but less interoperable systems, and contrasts Russian centralized, micromanaged command with Ukraine’s decentralized approach. It points to AI’s growing role in processing battlefield data. The Baltic states are advised to design command systems that are usable, scalable, resilient, and integrated with reservists, and to focus on disrupting Russia’s command and control rather than just destroying units. The evolving dynamics in the operational and strategic command especially regarding Ukraine’s reforms and Russian command constraints are discussed. Public political pressure affecting Ukraine’s military leadership changes is noted. The article is the second in a series addressing different aspects of hybrid-threat warfighting functions and underlines the importance of pre-war preparation of wartime command relationships, mission command responsibility, and organizational adaptation to the nature of warfare.

The article analyzes lessons from the war in Ukraine relevant to Baltic defense, focusing on command structures and warfighting functions. Retired Estonian generals Martin Herem and Veiko-Vello Palm emphasize the need for Baltic states to strengthen divisional command, targeting processes, and capabilities to disrupt enemy command and control. They stress adaptation, rapid capability integration, and willingness to change as crucial. Ukraine's shift to a corps-based operational command level, mission command philosophy, and the importance of training reservists with active-duty procedures and systems are highlighted. The article compares Ukraine’s more user-friendly and rapid command-and-control systems with NATO’s highly secure but less interoperable systems, and contrasts Russian centralized, micromanaged command with Ukraine’s decentralized approach. It points to AI’s growing role in processing battlefield data. The Baltic states are advised to design command systems that are usable, scalable, resilient, and integrated with reservists, and to focus on disrupting Russia’s command and control rather than just destroying units. The evolving dynamics in the operational and strategic command especially regarding Ukraine’s reforms and Russian command constraints are discussed. Public political pressure affecting Ukraine’s military leadership changes is noted. The article is the second in a series addressing different aspects of hybrid-threat warfighting functions and underlines the importance of pre-war preparation of wartime command relationships, mission command responsibility, and organizational adaptation to the nature of warfare.