Lithuania reports that Russia has significantly expanded its GPS spoofing capability from its Kaliningrad exclave, with 36 GPS spoofing antennas now active compared to 3 in early 2025, enabling falsification of GPS signals up to 450 km deep into Europe. This interference affects aviation and mobile networks in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, parts of Poland, Finland, Sweden, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea region. The spoofing has become systemic, permanent, and is linked to Russian provocations against European security, especially increasing since the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius. Past incidents include GPS disruptions on Spanish military and EU Commission planes near Kaliningrad, and jamming blamed on Russia by Estonia and Finland. Lithuania's mobile networks near Kaliningrad degrade in quality during spike events tied to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia.

Lithuania reports that Russia has significantly expanded its GPS spoofing capability from its Kaliningrad exclave, with 36 GPS spoofing antennas now active compared to 3 in early 2025, enabling falsification of GPS signals up to 450 km deep into Europe. This interference affects aviation and mobile networks in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, parts of Poland, Finland, Sweden, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea region. The spoofing has become systemic, permanent, and is linked to Russian provocations against European security, especially increasing since the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius. Past incidents include GPS disruptions on Spanish military and EU Commission planes near Kaliningrad, and jamming blamed on Russia by Estonia and Finland. Lithuania's mobile networks near Kaliningrad degrade in quality during spike events tied to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia.