Ahead of the Latvian parliamentary elections, Kremlin-linked networks active in Latvia have intensified operations, consistent with typical methods. Notably, two unusual activities are observed: activation of the GRU Storm 1516 network across all Baltic states, and responses from large AI models that, when asked about Latvian elections in Russian, produce Kremlin-sourced answers approximately 30% of the time. In contrast, answers in Latvian and English contain Kremlin-related content only a few percent of the time. This likely represents deliberate manipulation through large language model grooming.

Ahead of the Latvian parliamentary elections, Kremlin-linked networks active in Latvia have intensified operations, consistent with typical methods. Notably, two unusual activities are observed: activation of the GRU Storm 1516 network across all Baltic states, and responses from large AI models that, when asked about Latvian elections in Russian, produce Kremlin-sourced answers approximately 30% of the time. In contrast, answers in Latvian and English contain Kremlin-related content only a few percent of the time. This likely represents deliberate manipulation through large language model grooming.