Chinese state-owned surveillance camera manufacturers Dahua and Hikvision have deeply penetrated Czech critical infrastructure, including military facilities, weapons depots, government ministries, courts, regional police stations, railways, airports, and other key sites. Despite explicit warnings issued by the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) in August 2025 against the use of these cameras, numerous Czech state institutions continue purchasing and deploying them. The cameras are reportedly disconnected from the internet and operate on separate networks within ministries or agencies; however, cybersecurity experts warn that disconnection does not guarantee security due to possible misconfigurations or future software updates that could enable remote access. The cameras also possess features such as Uyghur ethnic identification, a method previously used for mass surveillance and repression in China. Investigations revealed these Chinese cameras monitor highly sensitive military sites including weapons depots and vehicle fleets within military training areas at Hradiště and Olomouc. Contracts for repair and maintenance of these devices persist after the official warnings. Furthermore, the article documents concerns over potential exploitation of these compromised devices for espionage, such as reported use by Russian forces to conduct surveillance and missile guidance during the Ukraine conflict. Both Hikvision and Dahua face international sanctions and bans due to their ties to the Chinese state security apparatus and alleged complicity in human rights abuses and military aid to Russia. Czech institutions justify continued use citing budgetary constraints and reliance on non-internet-connected camera systems; yet experts highlight significant security risks remain. Similar bans or phase-outs are underway in countries like Lithuania, the UK, and Denmark, but no EU-wide ban exists. The article underscores the ongoing infiltration of Chinese surveillance technology into critical Czech infrastructure as a significant security and hybrid warfare vulnerability.

Chinese state-owned surveillance camera manufacturers Dahua and Hikvision have deeply penetrated Czech critical infrastructure, including military facilities, weapons depots, government ministries, courts, regional police stations, railways, airports, and other key sites. Despite explicit warnings issued by the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) in August 2025 against the use of these cameras, numerous Czech state institutions continue purchasing and deploying them. The cameras are reportedly disconnected from the internet and operate on separate networks within ministries or agencies; however, cybersecurity experts warn that disconnection does not guarantee security due to possible misconfigurations or future software updates that could enable remote access. The cameras also possess features such as Uyghur ethnic identification, a method previously used for mass surveillance and repression in China. Investigations revealed these Chinese cameras monitor highly sensitive military sites including weapons depots and vehicle fleets within military training areas at Hradiště and Olomouc. Contracts for repair and maintenance of these devices persist after the official warnings. Furthermore, the article documents concerns over potential exploitation of these compromised devices for espionage, such as reported use by Russian forces to conduct surveillance and missile guidance during the Ukraine conflict. Both Hikvision and Dahua face international sanctions and bans due to their ties to the Chinese state security apparatus and alleged complicity in human rights abuses and military aid to Russia. Czech institutions justify continued use citing budgetary constraints and reliance on non-internet-connected camera systems; yet experts highlight significant security risks remain. Similar bans or phase-outs are underway in countries like Lithuania, the UK, and Denmark, but no EU-wide ban exists. The article underscores the ongoing infiltration of Chinese surveillance technology into critical Czech infrastructure as a significant security and hybrid warfare vulnerability.