On or before 30 March 2024, a GPS jammer used by Russia has been conclusively identified as stationary on land in Kaliningrad. This determination was made by analyzing radio horizon positions where aircraft first encountered signal interference, using triangulation methods and refined datasets. The jammer exhibits directional and variable power modes, affecting aircraft primarily in the Suwalki gap, Vilnius, and occasionally low-power jamming in the vicinity of Gdansk. The analyst encourages further independent verification and statistical testing of the data. NATO is reportedly fully aware of the jamming device's location and operational details. The event highlights the persistent Russian effort to disrupt Baltic civil and military aviation navigation through electronic warfare.

On or before 30 March 2024, a GPS jammer used by Russia has been conclusively identified as stationary on land in Kaliningrad. This determination was made by analyzing radio horizon positions where aircraft first encountered signal interference, using triangulation methods and refined datasets. The jammer exhibits directional and variable power modes, affecting aircraft primarily in the Suwalki gap, Vilnius, and occasionally low-power jamming in the vicinity of Gdansk. The analyst encourages further independent verification and statistical testing of the data. NATO is reportedly fully aware of the jamming device's location and operational details. The event highlights the persistent Russian effort to disrupt Baltic civil and military aviation navigation through electronic warfare.