Signal
Submitted
Nov 20, 2026, 14:24 UTC
On 24 February 2022 around 0302–0415 UTC, a deliberate cyber-attack exploited a VPN misconfiguration on Viasat’s KA-SAT network, using trusted management access to push destructive commands that disabled tens of thousands of residential "Tooway" modems—mainly in Ukraine and across Europe—while simultaneous malicious traffic from SurfBeam2/2+ equipment in Ukraine caused denial-of-service effects; mobility and government KA-SAT users and other Viasat networks were unaffected, and Viasat is restoring service via modem replacement and factory resets while cooperating with Mandiant, Skylogic, and international authorities.
On 24 February 2022, Viasat reports that its KA-SAT consumer-oriented satellite broadband network suffered a multifaceted, deliberate cyber-attack that caused a partial interruption of service, primarily affecting residential "Tooway"-brand modems in Ukraine and across Europe. The attack began at approximately 0302 UTC and involved a ground-based network intrusion exploiting a misconfiguration in a VPN appliance, allowing the attacker to gain remote access to the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network. From there, the attacker moved laterally to a specific management network segment and executed legitimate but destructive management commands simultaneously on a large number of residential modems. These commands overwrote key data in the modems' flash memory, preventing them from accessing the network but not physically destroying them. Concurrently, high volumes of focused, malicious traffic emanated from several SurfBeam2 and SurfBeam 2+ modems and/or associated customer premise equipment physically located within Ukraine, creating a targeted denial-of-service effect that made it difficult for many modems to stay online. Over the next several hours, as Viasat and Eutelsat subsidiary Skylogic attempted to force malicious modems offline and triage the incident, additional malicious modems appeared and continued the traffic-based attack. By approximately 0415 UTC, Viasat and Skylogic observed a sharp drop in the number of modems online across much of Europe within the same consumer-oriented service partition, and tens of thousands of modems went offline and did not attempt to reconnect. The incident impacted a majority of previously active modems in Ukraine and a substantial number in other parts of Europe but did not affect Viasat's directly managed mobility or government users on KA-SAT, nor other Viasat networks worldwide. Viasat states there is no evidence that end-user data, customer personal equipment, the KA-SAT satellite itself, or its ground infrastructure were accessed or compromised beyond the modem management segment, and no evidence of supply-chain interference or compromise of modem software or firmware distribution processes. Network stabilization and security mitigation actions began immediately, with the network largely stabilized within hours and fully stabilized within several days. Viasat undertook precautionary measures to protect back-office and analytics services and worked with Skylogic to implement mitigation and recovery actions, details of which are withheld for security reasons. To restore service, some end-customer modems received over-the-air updates, while tens of thousands of replacement modems (nearly 30,000 already shipped to date) were provided to distributors as the fastest restoration method. Impacted modems can be fully restored by a factory reset. Viasat believes the purpose of the attack was to interrupt service. The company is collaborating with incident-response firm Mandiant, Eutelsat/Skylogic, law enforcement, and U.S. and international government agencies in an ongoing investigation. KA-SAT commercial broadband service was originally launched by Eutelsat on 31 May 2011. Viasat acquired Euro Broadband Infrastructure Sàrl (EBI) and the KA-SAT asset and ground infrastructure in April 2021, with Skylogic continuing to operate the ground segment under a transition agreement while Viasat acts as the wholesale provider to an independent distributor network serving primarily residential customers in Europe.
Confidence: High
The core of the report is a deliberate, large-scale cyber-attack against satellite broadband infrastructure serving Ukraine and Europe, executed via unauthorized access to a trusted management network and destructive commands against tens of thousands of civilian modems. This clearly matches Cyber & Information Warfare and constitutes hostile aggressor behavior against critical communications infrastructure in a conflict context. The report is authored by the victim operator with detailed tec...
Source URL
https://viasat.com/perspectives/corporate/2022/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview
Published as a hybrid-warfare signal with a public source and reviewer-approved assessment bands. See the methodology for how records are assessed.
{
"id": "8c931e63-28d6-41df-ab31-db1c055f110e",
"url": "https://viasat.com/perspectives/corporate/2022/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview",
"source": "hwt_web_submit",
"status": "processed",
"category": "Cyber & Information Warfare",
"subcategory": "Cyber Attacks",
"incident_type": "Attacks on critical infrastructure (energy, transport, hospitals)",
"country": "Ukraine",
"source_reliability": "F",
"info_credibility": "6",
"tags": [
"Viasat",
"KA-SAT",
"Skylogic",
"Eutelsat",
"Euro Broadband Infrastructure Sàrl",
"EBI",
"Mandiant",
"SurfBeam2",
"SurfBeam 2+",
"Tooway",
"VPN misconfiguration",
"trusted management network",
"flash memory overwrite",
"satellite broadband",
"critical infrastructure",
"Ukraine",
"european union",
"denial of service",
"residential modems",
"incident response"
],
"nodes": [],
"countries": [
"Ukraine"
],
"where_text": "Cyberspace",
"headline": null,
"description": "On 24 February 2022, Viasat reports that its KA-SAT consumer-oriented satellite broadband network suffered a multifaceted, deliberate cyber-attack that caused a partial interruption of service, primarily affecting residential \"Tooway\"-brand modems in Ukraine and across Europe. The attack began at approximately 0302 UTC and involved a ground-based network intrusion exploiting a misconfiguration in a VPN appliance, allowing the attacker to gain remote access to the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network. From there, the attacker moved laterally to a specific management network segment and executed legitimate but destructive management commands simultaneously on a large number of residential modems. These commands overwrote key data in the modems' flash memory, preventing them from accessing the network but not physically destroying them. Concurrently, high volumes of focused, malicious traffic emanated from several SurfBeam2 and SurfBeam 2+ modems and/or associated customer premise equipment physically located within Ukraine, creating a targeted denial-of-service effect that made it difficult for many modems to stay online. Over the next several hours, as Viasat and Eutelsat subsidiary Skylogic attempted to force malicious modems offline and triage the incident, additional malicious modems appeared and continued the traffic-based attack. By approximately 0415 UTC, Viasat and Skylogic observed a sharp drop in the number of modems online across much of Europe within the same consumer-oriented service partition, and tens of thousands of modems went offline and did not attempt to reconnect. The incident impacted a majority of previously active modems in Ukraine and a substantial number in other parts of Europe but did not affect Viasat's directly managed mobility or government users on KA-SAT, nor other Viasat networks worldwide. Viasat states there is no evidence that end-user data, customer personal equipment, the KA-SAT satellite itself, or its ground infrastructure were accessed or compromised beyond the modem management segment, and no evidence of supply-chain interference or compromise of modem software or firmware distribution processes. Network stabilization and security mitigation actions began immediately, with the network largely stabilized within hours and fully stabilized within several days. Viasat undertook precautionary measures to protect back-office and analytics services and worked with Skylogic to implement mitigation and recovery actions, details of which are withheld for security reasons. To restore service, some end-customer modems received over-the-air updates, while tens of thousands of replacement modems (nearly 30,000 already shipped to date) were provided to distributors as the fastest restoration method. Impacted modems can be fully restored by a factory reset. Viasat believes the purpose of the attack was to interrupt service. The company is collaborating with incident-response firm Mandiant, Eutelsat/Skylogic, law enforcement, and U.S. and international government agencies in an ongoing investigation. KA-SAT commercial broadband service was originally launched by Eutelsat on 31 May 2011. Viasat acquired Euro Broadband Infrastructure Sàrl (EBI) and the KA-SAT asset and ground infrastructure in April 2021, with Skylogic continuing to operate the ground segment under a transition agreement while Viasat acts as the wholesale provider to an independent distributor network serving primarily residential customers in Europe.",
"summary_short": "On 24 February 2022 around 0302–0415 UTC, a deliberate cyber-attack exploited a VPN misconfiguration on Viasat’s KA-SAT network, using trusted management access to push destructive commands that disabled tens of thousands of residential \"Tooway\" modems—mainly in Ukraine and across Europe—while simultaneous malicious traffic from SurfBeam2/2+ equipment in Ukraine caused denial-of-service effects; mobility and government KA-SAT users and other Viasat networks were unaffected, and Viasat is restoring service via modem replacement and factory resets while cooperating with Mandiant, Skylogic, and international authorities.",
"summary_extended": null,
"actor_primary": "Viasat",
"target_primary": null,
"location_text": "Ukraine",
"location_region": null,
"location_coordinates_lat": 48.3794,
"location_coordinates_lon": 31.1656,
"location_precision": "Regional",
"is_aggressor_signal": true,
"signal_type": "HYBRID_SIGNAL",
"is_hybrid_war_signal": true,
"classification_complete": true,
"hybrid_signal_complete": true,
"classification_confidence": "High",
"classification_rationale": "The core of the report is a deliberate, large-scale cyber-attack against satellite broadband infrastructure serving Ukraine and Europe, executed via unauthorized access to a trusted management network and destructive commands against tens of thousands of civilian modems. This clearly matches Cyber & Information Warfare and constitutes hostile aggressor behavior against critical communications infrastructure in a conflict context. The report is authored by the victim operator with detailed tec...",
"event_time_utc": "2022-02-24T03:02:00.000Z",
"end_time_utc": null,
"event_time_confidence": "pm1h",
"created_at": "2026-11-20T14:24:01.397Z",
"updated_at": "2026-11-22T12:47:27.295Z",
"reliability_band": "pattern",
"location_precision_band": "regional",
"time_precision_band": "within_1h",
"severity_band": "significant",
"attribution_confidence_band": "high",
"attribution_basis": "single_source"
}Source reliability
F
Info credibility
6
Event time
Feb 24, 2022, 03:02 UTC
Event time confidence
pm1h
Location
Ukraine
Domain
Cyber / EW / Space
Primary actor
Viasat
Country
Ukraine
Countries
Ukraine
Tags
Viasat, KA-SAT, Skylogic, Eutelsat, Euro Broadband Infrastructure Sàrl, EBI, Mandiant, SurfBeam2, SurfBeam 2+, Tooway, VPN misconfiguration, trusted management network, flash memory overwrite, satellite broadband, critical infrastructure, Ukraine, european union, denial of service, residential modems, incident response