Oral evidence session held on 15 June 2026 by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy focused on deterrence in the context of Russian aggression. Witnesses included former British defense attaché John Foreman CBE, Professor Bettina Renz, investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov, and Professor Samuel Greene. Discussions covered the historical and contemporary nature of UK-Russian relations, Russia's intelligence and security services' mindset, the evolving threat from Russian special forces in intelligence agencies, the informal and centralized decision-making structure under Putin including nuclear weapon control, and Russia's ideological view of the UK as an adversary. Specific operational examples such as Russian sabotage tactics linked to British intelligence belief, the influence of John le Carré on Russian intelligence culture, and the competitive militarization of Russian agencies were detailed. Strategic recommendations highlighted the need for the UK to adopt a more nuanced deterrence model inclusive of non-military tools and cross-agency coordination, and to invest in capabilities for attribution and crisis confrontation regarding hybrid threats such as undersea cable sabotage.

Oral evidence session held on 15 June 2026 by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy focused on deterrence in the context of Russian aggression. Witnesses included former British defense attaché John Foreman CBE, Professor Bettina Renz, investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov, and Professor Samuel Greene. Discussions covered the historical and contemporary nature of UK-Russian relations, Russia's intelligence and security services' mindset, the evolving threat from Russian special forces in intelligence agencies, the informal and centralized decision-making structure under Putin including nuclear weapon control, and Russia's ideological view of the UK as an adversary. Specific operational examples such as Russian sabotage tactics linked to British intelligence belief, the influence of John le Carré on Russian intelligence culture, and the competitive militarization of Russian agencies were detailed. Strategic recommendations highlighted the need for the UK to adopt a more nuanced deterrence model inclusive of non-military tools and cross-agency coordination, and to invest in capabilities for attribution and crisis confrontation regarding hybrid threats such as undersea cable sabotage.