Latvian public broadcaster LSM reports on how smartphone interface language settings, particularly on Apple iPhones that do not support Latvian as a system language, can unintentionally expose Latvian users to Russian-language online information environments where Kremlin propaganda and disinformation are more prevalent. The article, authored by fact-checker and disinformation researcher Anete Bērzkalne, explains that the phone’s interface language setting is used by websites and apps to decide which language content to display. Because iPhones lack Latvian as a system/interface language, Latvian users who do not understand English or other offered languages are effectively forced to choose Russian, which signals to online services to deliver content in Russian. Cybersecurity researcher and Digital Security Center founder Elviss Strazdiņš is quoted explaining that when a website does not offer Latvian but does offer Russian and English, a user whose device language is set to Russian will by default see Russian-language content. The article highlights that Russian-language versions of Wikipedia articles on history, geopolitics, and conflicts can differ from Latvian or English versions, as they are often edited by users from Russia. It also notes that platforms such as YouTube and TikTok respond to device language settings, so setting Russian increases the likelihood of being recommended videos from Kremlin propaganda channels and other pro-Russian content creators, as well as encountering Russian bots and trolls spreading disinformation in comment sections, even under seemingly harmless entertainment content. As a contrast, the article points out that Lithuania reduced this exposure risk in 2024 when Apple added Lithuanian as an iPhone interface language, after sustained advocacy in social media, parliament, and the broader information space; Strazdiņš interprets this as a security-relevant achievement for Lithuania and suggests Latvia should pursue similar political and public pressure on Apple. He proposes that Latvian politicians could even threaten to stop using such devices in parliament or across public institutions unless Apple adds Latvian. Until such systemic change occurs, users are advised to work around the issue by configuring “preferred languages” on iPhones: placing Latvian first, English second, and other languages later, so that websites and apps will prioritize Latvian content where available and only fall back to other languages if necessary. The article frames this technical configuration issue as a “language trap” that can inadvertently draw Latvian residents into the Russian information bubble despite state efforts to block Russian propaganda websites and television channels, underlining it as a latent vulnerability in Latvia’s information security landscape driven by platform design rather than direct state action by Russia.

Latvian public broadcaster LSM reports on how smartphone interface language settings, particularly on Apple iPhones that do not support Latvian as a system language, can unintentionally expose Latvian users to Russian-language online information environments where Kremlin propaganda and disinformation are more prevalent. The article, authored by fact-checker and disinformation researcher Anete Bērzkalne, explains that the phone’s interface language setting is used by websites and apps to decide which language content to display. Because iPhones lack Latvian as a system/interface language, Latvian users who do not understand English or other offered languages are effectively forced to choose Russian, which signals to online services to deliver content in Russian. Cybersecurity researcher and Digital Security Center founder Elviss Strazdiņš is quoted explaining that when a website does not offer Latvian but does offer Russian and English, a user whose device language is set to Russian will by default see Russian-language content. The article highlights that Russian-language versions of Wikipedia articles on history, geopolitics, and conflicts can differ from Latvian or English versions, as they are often edited by users from Russia. It also notes that platforms such as YouTube and TikTok respond to device language settings, so setting Russian increases the likelihood of being recommended videos from Kremlin propaganda channels and other pro-Russian content creators, as well as encountering Russian bots and trolls spreading disinformation in comment sections, even under seemingly harmless entertainment content. As a contrast, the article points out that Lithuania reduced this exposure risk in 2024 when Apple added Lithuanian as an iPhone interface language, after sustained advocacy in social media, parliament, and the broader information space; Strazdiņš interprets this as a security-relevant achievement for Lithuania and suggests Latvia should pursue similar political and public pressure on Apple. He proposes that Latvian politicians could even threaten to stop using such devices in parliament or across public institutions unless Apple adds Latvian. Until such systemic change occurs, users are advised to work around the issue by configuring “preferred languages” on iPhones: placing Latvian first, English second, and other languages later, so that websites and apps will prioritize Latvian content where available and only fall back to other languages if necessary. The article frames this technical configuration issue as a “language trap” that can inadvertently draw Latvian residents into the Russian information bubble despite state efforts to block Russian propaganda websites and television channels, underlining it as a latent vulnerability in Latvia’s information security landscape driven by platform design rather than direct state action by Russia.