In the lead-up to the April 19, 2026 Bulgarian parliamentary elections, Kremlin-aligned actors conducted coordinated online information operations across multiple languages to undermine the vote by spreading claims of EU interference and censorship. These narratives centered on Bulgaria's activation of EU mechanisms to counter disinformation, specifically the Rapid Response System (RRS) under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), which was framed as an illegitimate censorship tool. The operations included multilingual campaigns invoking a 'Romanian scenario' to suggest EU and caretaker government interference analogous to alleged Russian interference in Romania's 2024 annulled presidential elections. Key triggers for the narrative amplification were RT's 'Battle for Bulgaria' series published between April 4-20, a viral Facebook post by candidate Rumen Radev on April 7 accusing the caretaker government of election hijacking with EU cooperation, and an April 8 tweet by French far-right politician Florian Philippot denying legitimacy to EU election support. Kremlin-aligned networks utilized laundering websites, known disinformation networks including Node of Time, Pravda Network, and Big News Network (BNN) — which republished banned RT content across over 400 domains to evade EU restrictions — and amplified content through Facebook, Telegram, and X. Domestically, pro-Russian Bulgarian outlets such as Pogled Info, Glasove, and Epicenter.bg spread similar narratives. These efforts aimed to delegitimize election defense mechanisms before their use, sow distrust in EU institutions, and shape the post-election information environment favorably for Russia-aligned actors, particularly benefiting Radev, a Moscow-favored politician who criticized EU sanctions on Russia and opposed military aid to Ukraine. The coordinated foreign and domestic dissemination signaled Bulgaria's vulnerable information environment subject to hybrid interference.

In the lead-up to the April 19, 2026 Bulgarian parliamentary elections, Kremlin-aligned actors conducted coordinated online information operations across multiple languages to undermine the vote by spreading claims of EU interference and censorship. These narratives centered on Bulgaria's activation of EU mechanisms to counter disinformation, specifically the Rapid Response System (RRS) under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), which was framed as an illegitimate censorship tool. The operations included multilingual campaigns invoking a 'Romanian scenario' to suggest EU and caretaker government interference analogous to alleged Russian interference in Romania's 2024 annulled presidential elections. Key triggers for the narrative amplification were RT's 'Battle for Bulgaria' series published between April 4-20, a viral Facebook post by candidate Rumen Radev on April 7 accusing the caretaker government of election hijacking with EU cooperation, and an April 8 tweet by French far-right politician Florian Philippot denying legitimacy to EU election support. Kremlin-aligned networks utilized laundering websites, known disinformation networks including Node of Time, Pravda Network, and Big News Network (BNN) — which republished banned RT content across over 400 domains to evade EU restrictions — and amplified content through Facebook, Telegram, and X. Domestically, pro-Russian Bulgarian outlets such as Pogled Info, Glasove, and Epicenter.bg spread similar narratives. These efforts aimed to delegitimize election defense mechanisms before their use, sow distrust in EU institutions, and shape the post-election information environment favorably for Russia-aligned actors, particularly benefiting Radev, a Moscow-favored politician who criticized EU sanctions on Russia and opposed military aid to Ukraine. The coordinated foreign and domestic dissemination signaled Bulgaria's vulnerable information environment subject to hybrid interference.