Latvian Military Intelligence Publishes Names of Russian and Belarusian GRU Spies Targeting Latvia

Intelligence & EspionageHuman Intelligence (HUMINT)Recruitment of locals

AggressorDefense

Summary

Latvia's Military Intelligence identifies multiple Russian and Belarusian GRU officers engaged in espionage against Latvia, highlighting ongoing covert intelligence and sabotage threats linked to wider Russian military objectives.

Latvia's Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD) disclosed the identities of several Russian and Belarusian GRU officers involved in espionage activities targeting Latvia as of April 2026. The individuals identified include senior Russian officers such as Major Aleksei Pizhikov and Colonel Aleksandr Gladkov, with Belarusian officer Sergei Baranov also named. MIDD emphasized the collaboration between Russian and Belarusian intelligence services, describing Belarus's military intelligence as effectively a 'branch' of the Russian GRU. Particularly highlighted was Ivanov, a Russian GRU officer active against Latvia since 2017, who managed an agent network gathering intelligence on Latvian critical infrastructure, NATO troop deployments, and societal support for Ukraine. Ivanov’s spy network was linked to similar operations uncovered in Ukraine supporting Russian military strikes. Following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, all Russian GRU officers acting under military attaché cover were expelled from Latvia’s Russian embassy, though Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operatives continue intelligence activities. MIDD warned that tactics and methods used by the GRU in Ukraine are likely to be applied against Latvia, including recruitment of vulnerable or pro-Kremlin local collaborators for espionage and sabotage, presenting significant threat to civil security. The disclosure aims to increase public awareness of these hostile intelligence threats and underscores Latvia's ongoing military counterintelligence efforts under the Defense Ministry's oversight.

Classification

Confidence: High

The article clearly identifies Russian and Belarusian GRU officers conducting espionage and sabotage recruitment inside Latvia, direct hostile actions aligned with Russian hybrid warfare. It also describes defensive counterintelligence and public disclosure by Latvian Military Intelligence as part of defense preparation.

Source URL

https://delfi.lv/193/politics/120113269/latvijas-specdienests-publisko-krievijas-un-baltkrievijas-spiegu-vardus

Open source

Provenance

Publisher: hwt_web_submit
Submitted: Apr 3, 2026, 10:39 UTC
Last updated: Nov 4, 2026, 08:35 UTC
Event time: Apr 2, 2026, 12:57 UTC

Published as a Defense Preparations signal with a public source and reviewer-approved assessment bands. See the methodology for how records are assessed.

Raw record

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  "id": "c0d5d519-8421-4384-b596-42a4f5c1e491",
  "url": "https://delfi.lv/193/politics/120113269/latvijas-specdienests-publisko-krievijas-un-baltkrievijas-spiegu-vardus",
  "source": "hwt_web_submit",
  "status": "approved",
  "category": "Intelligence & Espionage",
  "subcategory": "Human Intelligence (HUMINT)",
  "incident_type": "Recruitment of locals",
  "country": "Latvia",
  "source_reliability": "B",
  "info_credibility": "3",
  "tags": [
    "latvia",
    "russia",
    "gru",
    "belarus",
    "russian gru",
    "belarusian gru",
    "espionage",
    "military intelligence",
    "hybrid warfare",
    "spy network",
    "agent recruitment",
    "sabotage threats",
    "russia–ukraine war",
    "midd",
    "svr"
  ],
  "nodes": [
    "Node 2: 5th Column"
  ],
  "countries": [],
  "where_text": "Land",
  "headline": "Latvian Military Intelligence Publishes Names of Russian and Belarusian GRU Spies Targeting Latvia",
  "description": "On April 2, 2026, Latvia's Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD) publicly identified multiple officers from the Russian GRU and one Belarusian GRU officer involved in intelligence operations against Latvia. The disclosed individuals include Russian officers Major Aleksei Pizhikov, Captain Aleksei Lesnikov, Captain Nikolai Chetverikov, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Yushin, Colonel Aleksandr Gladkov, and Grigoriy Ivanov, as well as Belarusian officer Sergei Baranov. MIDD highlighted the espionage activities of Ivanov since 2017, centered on gathering intelligence about Latvian critical infrastructure, NATO forces presence, and societal attitudes, including practical info such as mobile prepaid SIM card conditions. The report details Russian and Belarusian close intelligence cooperation, describing Belarus as a de facto branch of the Russian GRU. MIDD warns that GRU spy networks in Latvia could operate like those exposed in Ukraine, including sabotage and intelligence supporting military strikes. It also outlines the recruitment and use of agents, including vulnerable Latvian residents and pro-Kremlin volunteers, for espionage and sabotage. The Latvian GRU presence at the Russian embassy ended in early 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but SVR officers remain active. MIDD operates under Latvia's Defense Minister, tasked with military counterintelligence and broad intelligence functions.",
  "summary_short": "Latvia's Military Intelligence identifies multiple Russian and Belarusian GRU officers engaged in espionage against Latvia, highlighting ongoing covert intelligence and sabotage threats linked to wider Russian military objectives.",
  "summary_extended": "Latvia's Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD) disclosed the identities of several Russian and Belarusian GRU officers involved in espionage activities targeting Latvia as of April 2026. The individuals identified include senior Russian officers such as Major Aleksei Pizhikov and Colonel Aleksandr Gladkov, with Belarusian officer Sergei Baranov also named. MIDD emphasized the collaboration between Russian and Belarusian intelligence services, describing Belarus's military intelligence as effectively a 'branch' of the Russian GRU. Particularly highlighted was Ivanov, a Russian GRU officer active against Latvia since 2017, who managed an agent network gathering intelligence on Latvian critical infrastructure, NATO troop deployments, and societal support for Ukraine. Ivanov’s spy network was linked to similar operations uncovered in Ukraine supporting Russian military strikes. Following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, all Russian GRU officers acting under military attaché cover were expelled from Latvia’s Russian embassy, though Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operatives continue intelligence activities. MIDD warned that tactics and methods used by the GRU in Ukraine are likely to be applied against Latvia, including recruitment of vulnerable or pro-Kremlin local collaborators for espionage and sabotage, presenting significant threat to civil security. The disclosure aims to increase public awareness of these hostile intelligence threats and underscores Latvia's ongoing military counterintelligence efforts under the Defense Ministry's oversight.",
  "actor_primary": "Grigoriy Ivanov",
  "target_primary": null,
  "location_text": "Latvia",
  "location_region": null,
  "location_coordinates_lat": null,
  "location_coordinates_lon": null,
  "location_precision": "Unknown",
  "is_aggressor_signal": true,
  "signal_type": "DEFENSE_PREP_SIGNAL",
  "is_hybrid_war_signal": true,
  "classification_complete": true,
  "hybrid_signal_complete": true,
  "classification_confidence": "High",
  "classification_rationale": "The article clearly identifies Russian and Belarusian GRU officers conducting espionage and sabotage recruitment inside Latvia, direct hostile actions aligned with Russian hybrid warfare. It also describes defensive counterintelligence and public disclosure by Latvian Military Intelligence as part of defense preparation.",
  "event_time_utc": "2026-04-02T12:57:00.000Z",
  "end_time_utc": null,
  "event_time_confidence": "exact",
  "created_at": "2026-04-03T10:39:00.099Z",
  "updated_at": "2026-11-04T08:35:32.139Z",
  "reliability_band": "strong",
  "location_precision_band": "unknown",
  "time_precision_band": "exact",
  "severity_band": "significant",
  "attribution_confidence_band": "high",
  "attribution_basis": "independent_sources"
}

Public assessmentReliability: StrongSeverity: SignificantAttribution: HighIndependence confirmedTime: ExactLocation: Unknown

Source reliability

Info credibility

Event time

Apr 2, 2026, 12:57 UTC

Event time confidence

exact

Location

Latvia

Primary actor

Grigoriy Ivanov

Country

Latvia

Tags

latvia, russia, gru, belarus, russian gru, belarusian gru, espionage, military intelligence, hybrid warfare, spy network, agent recruitment, sabotage threats, russia–ukraine war, midd, svr

Nodes

Node 2: 5th Column

Loading signal...

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MIDD emphasized the collaboration between Russian and Belarusian intelligence services, describing Belarus's military intelligence as effectively a 'branch' of the Russian GRU. Particularly highlighted was Ivanov, a Russian GRU officer active against Latvia since 2017, who managed an agent network gathering intelligence on Latvian critical infrastructure, NATO troop deployments, and societal support for Ukraine. Ivanov’s spy network was linked to similar operations uncovered in Ukraine supporting Russian military strikes. Following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, all Russian GRU officers acting under military attaché cover were expelled from Latvia’s Russian embassy, though Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operatives continue intelligence activities. MIDD warned that tactics and methods used by the GRU in Ukraine are likely to be applied against Latvia, including recruitment of vulnerable or pro-Kremlin local collaborators for espionage and sabotage, presenting significant threat to civil security. 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