The investigative report details how a network of companies connected to retired Russian FSB generals operates dredging and port services across EU ports, including in Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Russia and Crimea. The network includes the EHT Group and GDP Group, managed by former FSB officers such as Andrei Shkrabo and led by businessmen like Aleksandrs Borodins Jr. Their dredgers, including Astra and Poseidon I, work in Latvian waters (port of Riga) while others with Russian flags operate in Ust-Luga and the Azov Sea. The companies have a long history dating back to Soviet times, with sophisticated corporate structures obscuring ownership via multiple jurisdictions including Cyprus, USA, and Liechtenstein. Their activities include dredging works in sanctioned Crimean ports despite sanctions, indicating sanction evasion. Experts warn their access allows detailed underwater mapping (bathymetry, cables, pipelines) using Russian-developed software potentially vulnerable to backdoors, facilitating Russian intelligence and sabotage threats. GPS spoofing by Russian forces further complicates monitoring. Ukrainian and maritime security analysts urge EU and NATO to improve legislation and counterintelligence to respond to these covert hybrid warfare tools embedded in civilian maritime industries.

The investigative report details how a network of companies connected to retired Russian FSB generals operates dredging and port services across EU ports, including in Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Russia and Crimea. The network includes the EHT Group and GDP Group, managed by former FSB officers such as Andrei Shkrabo and led by businessmen like Aleksandrs Borodins Jr. Their dredgers, including Astra and Poseidon I, work in Latvian waters (port of Riga) while others with Russian flags operate in Ust-Luga and the Azov Sea. The companies have a long history dating back to Soviet times, with sophisticated corporate structures obscuring ownership via multiple jurisdictions including Cyprus, USA, and Liechtenstein. Their activities include dredging works in sanctioned Crimean ports despite sanctions, indicating sanction evasion. Experts warn their access allows detailed underwater mapping (bathymetry, cables, pipelines) using Russian-developed software potentially vulnerable to backdoors, facilitating Russian intelligence and sabotage threats. GPS spoofing by Russian forces further complicates monitoring. Ukrainian and maritime security analysts urge EU and NATO to improve legislation and counterintelligence to respond to these covert hybrid warfare tools embedded in civilian maritime industries.