The EUvsDisinfo analysis article "My home is not my castle: Kaliningrad as an address for Kremlin propaganda. Part 2" describes how Russian state media and pro‑Kremlin voices use the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad as a propaganda showcase to sustain domestic support for the invasion of Ukraine and a siege‑mentality narrative against the West. The text is structured into several thematic sections and is illustrated with a photo of a cargo vessel named "Passat" in Kaliningrad seaport.

The article emphasises the everyday reality for residents of Kaliningrad under wartime conditions and contrasts it with official narratives. It notes that life in the exclave is shaped by wartime logistics, sanctions, and economic strain: food prices are high, choice is limited, and daily life features queues and shortages. The article asserts that Russian television and propaganda instead frame Kaliningrad as a "fortress" region heroically resisting Western pressure and Lithuanian/Polish "blockades", and present any logistical disruption as proof of Western hostility rather than consequences of Russia’s own full‑scale invasion of Ukraine.

A section titled "The everyday economy of war: food prices and shortages" details that sanctions, disrupted transit routes across Lithuania and Poland, and prioritisation of military supplies have led to more expensive and less diverse food in Kaliningrad. The population is said to experience rising prices and occasional scarcity of basic goods, while local officials downplay the issues or blame them on NATO, the EU, and especially neighbouring Lithuania. The article suggests that such claims are used in domestic information campaigns to maintain a sense of encirclement and to justify further militarisation of the region.

In "Logistical anxieties", the author describes recurring worries over rail and road connections from mainland Russia through Lithuania and Belarus. Russian propaganda reportedly portrays any EU regulation or customs check as a "blockade" against Kaliningrad. The piece notes that transport corridors for sanctioned goods have been restricted by EU measures, but stresses that civilian supplies continue to move, contradicting Russian claims of a total blockade. The article underlines that these logistical themes are used in Russian talk‑shows and news bulletins to depict the EU and NATO as deliberately seeking to starve or isolate Russian citizens in the exclave.

The section "Sabotage, fear, and the militarisation of everyday life" covers narratives that frame accidents or disruptions in Kaliningrad infrastructure (for example at ports, energy facilities, or on railways) as possible acts of Western saboteurs or Ukrainian agents. According to the analysis, pro‑Kremlin commentators frequently speculate about sabotage or terrorism without evidence, encouraging residents to view ordinary incidents through a security lens and to report on neighbours or visitors. This rhetorical framing is said to contribute to an atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and heightened security presence, including more visible patrols and checks. The article links this to Russia’s broader strategy of mobilising society for a "long war" and normalising a permanent internal emergency.

Another section, "The psychology of drone warfare", discusses how Russian media use reports about drones and UAVs to influence public opinion in Kaliningrad and beyond. The article mentions coverage of Ukrainian drone attacks inside Russia and speculated threats against facilities in the Baltic region, including vague talk of drones targeting infrastructure around Kaliningrad or Russian Baltic Fleet assets. These stories are framed as evidence that the West and Ukraine are willing to strike Russian territory directly, reinforcing fear of external attack. At the same time, Russian outlets showcase their own drones, drone operators and training programmes as symbols of technological prowess and patriotic duty, encouraging young people to see drone warfare as a normal career path. The analysis argues that this dual narrative – fear of enemy drones and glorification of Russian drones – psychologically conditions the population for continuous conflict.

The concluding part, "The myth of the outpost: the price of reality", states that Kremlin propaganda presents Kaliningrad as an advanced outpost or "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of Russia in Europe, supposedly thriving despite sanctions and surrounded by hostile NATO states. In fact, according to the article, residents bear economic and social costs: higher prices, limited travel, dependence on Moscow’s subsidies and decisions, and the risk that the region could become a front‑line theatre if the war escalates. The author argues that this contrast between triumphant messaging and daily hardship illustrates how the Kremlin uses information operations to mask the real impacts of its aggression against Ukraine and to keep domestic audiences supportive.

The webpage includes several structural elements: the headline "My home is not my castle: Kaliningrad as an address for Kremlin propaganda. Part 2"; a category label "Disinfo" near the top; social‑sharing buttons to Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and email; an image caption identifying the vessel "Passat" and "Kaliningrad seaport"; and a tags section listing at least "Kaliningrad" and "Russia". Below the article text, a short author box provides the name "Adam Reichardt" and states that he is the author of the piece. A "Disclaimer" box explains that the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the EU institutions. The sidebar and "Also recommended" section link to related EUvsDisinfo analyses on Russian propaganda themes but do not materially change the core narrative about Kaliningrad.

The piece relies on open reporting and qualitative observation rather than hard statistics or official documents. It does not cite specific dates for particular incidents or provide named Russian officials’ quotes, but instead summarises recurring narratives on Russian state TV and in regional media. The geographic focus is explicitly Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea bordered by Poland and Lithuania, while the broader context is Russia’s ongoing full‑scale invasion of Ukraine and confrontation with NATO/EU countries. The article characterises the information environment around Kaliningrad as an example of Kremlin hybrid‑warfare information operations aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences.

The EUvsDisinfo analysis article "My home is not my castle: Kaliningrad as an address for Kremlin propaganda. Part 2" describes how Russian state media and pro‑Kremlin voices use the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad as a propaganda showcase to sustain domestic support for the invasion of Ukraine and a siege‑mentality narrative against the West. The text is structured into several thematic sections and is illustrated with a photo of a cargo vessel named "Passat" in Kaliningrad seaport.

The article emphasises the everyday reality for residents of Kaliningrad under wartime conditions and contrasts it with official narratives. It notes that life in the exclave is shaped by wartime logistics, sanctions, and economic strain: food prices are high, choice is limited, and daily life features queues and shortages. The article asserts that Russian television and propaganda instead frame Kaliningrad as a "fortress" region heroically resisting Western pressure and Lithuanian/Polish "blockades", and present any logistical disruption as proof of Western hostility rather than consequences of Russia’s own full‑scale invasion of Ukraine.

A section titled "The everyday economy of war: food prices and shortages" details that sanctions, disrupted transit routes across Lithuania and Poland, and prioritisation of military supplies have led to more expensive and less diverse food in Kaliningrad. The population is said to experience rising prices and occasional scarcity of basic goods, while local officials downplay the issues or blame them on NATO, the EU, and especially neighbouring Lithuania. The article suggests that such claims are used in domestic information campaigns to maintain a sense of encirclement and to justify further militarisation of the region.

In "Logistical anxieties", the author describes recurring worries over rail and road connections from mainland Russia through Lithuania and Belarus. Russian propaganda reportedly portrays any EU regulation or customs check as a "blockade" against Kaliningrad. The piece notes that transport corridors for sanctioned goods have been restricted by EU measures, but stresses that civilian supplies continue to move, contradicting Russian claims of a total blockade. The article underlines that these logistical themes are used in Russian talk‑shows and news bulletins to depict the EU and NATO as deliberately seeking to starve or isolate Russian citizens in the exclave.

The section "Sabotage, fear, and the militarisation of everyday life" covers narratives that frame accidents or disruptions in Kaliningrad infrastructure (for example at ports, energy facilities, or on railways) as possible acts of Western saboteurs or Ukrainian agents. According to the analysis, pro‑Kremlin commentators frequently speculate about sabotage or terrorism without evidence, encouraging residents to view ordinary incidents through a security lens and to report on neighbours or visitors. This rhetorical framing is said to contribute to an atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and heightened security presence, including more visible patrols and checks. The article links this to Russia’s broader strategy of mobilising society for a "long war" and normalising a permanent internal emergency.

Another section, "The psychology of drone warfare", discusses how Russian media use reports about drones and UAVs to influence public opinion in Kaliningrad and beyond. The article mentions coverage of Ukrainian drone attacks inside Russia and speculated threats against facilities in the Baltic region, including vague talk of drones targeting infrastructure around Kaliningrad or Russian Baltic Fleet assets. These stories are framed as evidence that the West and Ukraine are willing to strike Russian territory directly, reinforcing fear of external attack. At the same time, Russian outlets showcase their own drones, drone operators and training programmes as symbols of technological prowess and patriotic duty, encouraging young people to see drone warfare as a normal career path. The analysis argues that this dual narrative – fear of enemy drones and glorification of Russian drones – psychologically conditions the population for continuous conflict.

The concluding part, "The myth of the outpost: the price of reality", states that Kremlin propaganda presents Kaliningrad as an advanced outpost or "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of Russia in Europe, supposedly thriving despite sanctions and surrounded by hostile NATO states. In fact, according to the article, residents bear economic and social costs: higher prices, limited travel, dependence on Moscow’s subsidies and decisions, and the risk that the region could become a front‑line theatre if the war escalates. The author argues that this contrast between triumphant messaging and daily hardship illustrates how the Kremlin uses information operations to mask the real impacts of its aggression against Ukraine and to keep domestic audiences supportive.

The webpage includes several structural elements: the headline "My home is not my castle: Kaliningrad as an address for Kremlin propaganda. Part 2"; a category label "Disinfo" near the top; social‑sharing buttons to Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and email; an image caption identifying the vessel "Passat" and "Kaliningrad seaport"; and a tags section listing at least "Kaliningrad" and "Russia". Below the article text, a short author box provides the name "Adam Reichardt" and states that he is the author of the piece. A "Disclaimer" box explains that the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the EU institutions. The sidebar and "Also recommended" section link to related EUvsDisinfo analyses on Russian propaganda themes but do not materially change the core narrative about Kaliningrad.

The piece relies on open reporting and qualitative observation rather than hard statistics or official documents. It does not cite specific dates for particular incidents or provide named Russian officials’ quotes, but instead summarises recurring narratives on Russian state TV and in regional media. The geographic focus is explicitly Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea bordered by Poland and Lithuania, while the broader context is Russia’s ongoing full‑scale invasion of Ukraine and confrontation with NATO/EU countries. The article characterises the information environment around Kaliningrad as an example of Kremlin hybrid‑warfare information operations aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences.