Russian satellites, launched in 2014 and 2023 and known as Luch/Olymp 1 and 2, have been conducting proximity and rendezvous operations (RPOs) near European geostationary satellites, including those operated by Eutelsat and Intelsat. These Russian satellites position themselves between targeted satellites and their ground stations to intercept signals and eavesdrop on communications, including secure military communications. While RPOs can be used for benign purposes like satellite inspection or debris removal, the Luch satellites have been shadowing targets for months, sometimes approaching within five kilometers, indicating intent beyond routine inspection. This activity represents a signals intelligence (Sigint) campaign by Russia to identify vulnerabilities in NATO countries' satellite infrastructure and potentially intercept command links, which would allow future disruption or control of European satellites. This Russian behavior fits within a broader hybrid warfare strategy, paralleling Russia’s covert mapping and attacks on Western undersea cables, aiming to coerce European countries to reduce support to Ukraine. European officials, including Germany's Space Command and the UK, are increasingly advocating for transparency and development of European counterspace capabilities to mitigate these risks and defend space-based services crucial to military and economic security.

Russian satellites, launched in 2014 and 2023 and known as Luch/Olymp 1 and 2, have been conducting proximity and rendezvous operations (RPOs) near European geostationary satellites, including those operated by Eutelsat and Intelsat. These Russian satellites position themselves between targeted satellites and their ground stations to intercept signals and eavesdrop on communications, including secure military communications. While RPOs can be used for benign purposes like satellite inspection or debris removal, the Luch satellites have been shadowing targets for months, sometimes approaching within five kilometers, indicating intent beyond routine inspection. This activity represents a signals intelligence (Sigint) campaign by Russia to identify vulnerabilities in NATO countries' satellite infrastructure and potentially intercept command links, which would allow future disruption or control of European satellites. This Russian behavior fits within a broader hybrid warfare strategy, paralleling Russia’s covert mapping and attacks on Western undersea cables, aiming to coerce European countries to reduce support to Ukraine. European officials, including Germany's Space Command and the UK, are increasingly advocating for transparency and development of European counterspace capabilities to mitigate these risks and defend space-based services crucial to military and economic security.