Disclosing networks of state-linked information operations we've removed

Cyber & Information WarfareInformation OperationsPropaganda & disinformation campaigns

Aggressor

Summary

On June 12, 2020, Twitter disclosed removing 32,242 state-linked troll accounts linked to China, Russia, and Turkey for coordinated information operations.

Twitter disclosed the removal of 32,242 accounts involved in state-linked information operations from China, Russia, and Turkey, with cooperation from ASPI and Stanford Internet Observatory. The Chinese network included 23,750 core accounts tweeting in Chinese to promote CCP narratives and political deception about Hong Kong, plus around 150,000 amplifier accounts not publicly archived. The Russian network comprised 1,152 accounts linked to Current Policy, pushing pro-United Russia propaganda and attacking dissidents. The Turkish network involved 7,340 accounts tied to the AK Parti youth wing, amplifying political narratives supporting President Erdoğan and included compromised accounts used in hacking and spam. Twitter aims to improve transparency, measurement, and academic partnerships on information operations moving forward.

Classification

Confidence: High

The article explicitly describes hostile state-linked disinformation campaigns originating from China, Russia, and Turkey and their coordinated inauthentic manipulation of social media, representing clear hybrid aggressor activity.

Source URL

https://blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/information-operations-june-2020

Open source

Provenance

Publisher: extension
Submitted: Apr 28, 2026, 15:11 UTC
Last updated: Nov 4, 2026, 08:35 UTC
Event time: Jun 12, 2020, 00:00 UTC

Published as a hybrid-warfare signal with a public source and reviewer-approved assessment bands. See the methodology for how records are assessed.

Raw record

{
  "id": "fac11cfa-793c-468f-908c-152e3774b6da",
  "url": "https://blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/information-operations-june-2020",
  "source": "extension",
  "status": "approved",
  "category": "Cyber & Information Warfare",
  "subcategory": "Information Operations",
  "incident_type": "Propaganda & disinformation campaigns",
  "country": "Unknown",
  "source_reliability": "C",
  "info_credibility": "3",
  "tags": [
    "state-linked operations",
    "information operations",
    "disinformation",
    "China",
    "Russia",
    "Turkey",
    "Twitter takedown",
    "platform manipulation",
    "propaganda",
    "coordinated inauthentic behavior"
  ],
  "nodes": [
    "Node 2: 5th Column"
  ],
  "countries": [],
  "where_text": "Cyberspace",
  "headline": "Disclosing networks of state-linked information operations we've removed",
  "description": "On June 12, 2020, Twitter disclosed the removal of 32,242 accounts linked to state-backed information operations from China, Russia, and Turkey. The People's Republic of China network included 23,750 core accounts spreading geopolitical narratives favoring the CCP and deceptive content about Hong Kong, as well as approximately 150,000 amplifier accounts not published in the archive. The Russian network comprised 1,152 accounts associated with Current Policy, a site engaged in state-backed political propaganda promoting the United Russia party and attacking dissidents. The Turkish network, detected in early 2020, included 7,340 accounts linked to the youth wing of the ruling party AK Parti, amplifying pro-Erdoğan narratives and containing compromised accounts used for hacking and cryptocurrency spam. Twitter partnered with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and Stanford Internet Observatory in this investigation, highlighting efforts to advance public understanding of such manipulative campaigns.",
  "summary_short": "On June 12, 2020, Twitter disclosed removing 32,242 state-linked troll accounts linked to China, Russia, and Turkey for coordinated information operations.",
  "summary_extended": "Twitter disclosed the removal of 32,242 accounts involved in state-linked information operations from China, Russia, and Turkey, with cooperation from ASPI and Stanford Internet Observatory. The Chinese network included 23,750 core accounts tweeting in Chinese to promote CCP narratives and political deception about Hong Kong, plus around 150,000 amplifier accounts not publicly archived. The Russian network comprised 1,152 accounts linked to Current Policy, pushing pro-United Russia propaganda and attacking dissidents. The Turkish network involved 7,340 accounts tied to the AK Parti youth wing, amplifying political narratives supporting President Erdoğan and included compromised accounts used in hacking and spam. Twitter aims to improve transparency, measurement, and academic partnerships on information operations moving forward.",
  "actor_primary": "Communist Party of China (CCP)",
  "target_primary": null,
  "location_text": "Cyberspace",
  "location_region": "Cyberspace",
  "location_coordinates_lat": 26.4925331,
  "location_coordinates_lon": 92.3308789,
  "location_precision": "Regional",
  "is_aggressor_signal": true,
  "signal_type": "HYBRID_SIGNAL",
  "is_hybrid_war_signal": true,
  "classification_complete": true,
  "hybrid_signal_complete": true,
  "classification_confidence": "High",
  "classification_rationale": "The article explicitly describes hostile state-linked disinformation campaigns originating from China, Russia, and Turkey and their coordinated inauthentic manipulation of social media, representing clear hybrid aggressor activity.",
  "event_time_utc": "2020-06-12T00:00:00.000Z",
  "end_time_utc": null,
  "event_time_confidence": "exact",
  "created_at": "2026-04-28T15:11:00.096Z",
  "updated_at": "2026-11-04T08:35:32.139Z",
  "reliability_band": "strong",
  "location_precision_band": "regional",
  "time_precision_band": "exact",
  "severity_band": "moderate",
  "attribution_confidence_band": "high",
  "attribution_basis": "single_source"
}

Public assessmentReliability: StrongSeverity: ModerateAttribution: HighSingle sourceTime: ExactLocation: Regional

Source reliability

Info credibility

Event time

Jun 12, 2020, 00:00 UTC

Event time confidence

exact

Location

Cyberspace

Region

Cyberspace

Primary actor

Communist Party of China (CCP)

Country

Unknown

Tags

state-linked operations, information operations, disinformation, China, Russia, Turkey, Twitter takedown, platform manipulation, propaganda, coordinated inauthentic behavior

Nodes

Node 2: 5th Column

Loading signal...

{ "id": "fac11cfa-793c-468f-908c-152e3774b6da", "url": "https://blog.x.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/information-operations-june-2020", "source": "extension", "status": "approved", "category": "Cyber & Information Warfare", "subcategory": "Information Operations", "incident_type": "Propaganda & disinformation campaigns", "country": "Unknown", "source_reliability": "C", "info_credibility": "3", "tags": [ "state-linked operations", "information operations", "disinformation", "China", "Russia", "Turkey", "Twitter takedown", "platform manipulation", "propaganda", "coordinated inauthentic behavior" ], "nodes": [ "Node 2: 5th Column" ], "countries": [], "where_text": "Cyberspace", "headline": "Disclosing networks of state-linked information operations we've removed", "description": "On June 12, 2020, Twitter disclosed the removal of 32,242 accounts linked to state-backed information operations from China, Russia, and Turkey. The People's Republic of China network included 23,750 core accounts spreading geopolitical narratives favoring the CCP and deceptive content about Hong Kong, as well as approximately 150,000 amplifier accounts not published in the archive. The Russian network comprised 1,152 accounts associated with Current Policy, a site engaged in state-backed political propaganda promoting the United Russia party and attacking dissidents. The Turkish network, detected in early 2020, included 7,340 accounts linked to the youth wing of the ruling party AK Parti, amplifying pro-Erdoğan narratives and containing compromised accounts used for hacking and cryptocurrency spam. Twitter partnered with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and Stanford Internet Observatory in this investigation, highlighting efforts to advance public understanding of such manipulative campaigns.", "summary_short": "On June 12, 2020, Twitter disclosed removing 32,242 state-linked troll accounts linked to China, Russia, and Turkey for coordinated information operations.", "summary_extended": "Twitter disclosed the removal of 32,242 accounts involved in state-linked information operations from China, Russia, and Turkey, with cooperation from ASPI and Stanford Internet Observatory. The Chinese network included 23,750 core accounts tweeting in Chinese to promote CCP narratives and political deception about Hong Kong, plus around 150,000 amplifier accounts not publicly archived. The Russian network comprised 1,152 accounts linked to Current Policy, pushing pro-United Russia propaganda and attacking dissidents. The Turkish network involved 7,340 accounts tied to the AK Parti youth wing, amplifying political narratives supporting President Erdoğan and included compromised accounts used in hacking and spam. Twitter aims to improve transparency, measurement, and academic partnerships on information operations moving forward.", "actor_primary": "Communist Party of China (CCP)", "target_primary": null, "location_text": "Cyberspace", "location_region": "Cyberspace", "location_coordinates_lat": 26.4925331, "location_coordinates_lon": 92.3308789, "location_precision": "Regional", "is_aggressor_signal": true, "signal_type": "HYBRID_SIGNAL", "is_hybrid_war_signal": true, "classification_complete": true, "hybrid_signal_complete": true, "classification_confidence": "High", "classification_rationale": "The article explicitly describes hostile state-linked disinformation campaigns originating from China, Russia, and Turkey and their coordinated inauthentic manipulation of social media, representing clear hybrid aggressor activity.", "event_time_utc": "2020-06-12T00:00:00.000Z", "end_time_utc": null, "event_time_confidence": "exact", "created_at": "2026-04-28T15:11:00.096Z", "updated_at": "2026-11-04T08:35:32.139Z", "reliability_band": "strong", "location_precision_band": "regional", "time_precision_band": "exact", "severity_band": "moderate", "attribution_confidence_band": "high", "attribution_basis": "single_source" }