Hybrid and Defense Preparations are shown as separate sections for the same week. If one scope is unavailable, the gap stays visible instead of being folded into the other narrative.
Hybrid readyDefense Prep readyFeb 9 – February 15, 202631 signals at generation
This briefing is a point-in-time summary built from open-source signals that were automatically processed and have not undergone individual human editorial review. Later signals are not retroactively included. Some details may be unverified.
Scope coverage
One weekly brief bundle with separate Hybrid and Defense Preparations sections. Missing sections stay visible so coverage gaps are obvious.
The current section is the brief you opened; the other pill jumps to the sibling scope for the same week.
Hybrid section
Hybrid sectionFinalCurrent17 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Nordic and Baltic intelligence assessments state that Russia has structurally militarized its economy, dedicating roughly 38–41% of federal spending to defence, regenerating military power, and pairing this with persistent hybrid tools such as cyber operations, espionage, and mapping of European critical infrastructure.
Hybrid and Defense Preparations are shown as separate sections for the same week. If one scope is unavailable, the gap stays visible instead of being folded into the other narrative.
Hybrid readyDefense Prep readyFeb 9 – February 15, 202631 signals at generation
This briefing is a point-in-time summary built from open-source signals that were automatically processed and have not undergone individual human editorial review. Later signals are not retroactively included. Some details may be unverified.
Scope coverage
One weekly brief bundle with separate Hybrid and Defense Preparations sections. Missing sections stay visible so coverage gaps are obvious.
The current section is the brief you opened; the other pill jumps to the sibling scope for the same week.
Hybrid section
Hybrid sectionFinalCurrent17 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Nordic and Baltic intelligence assessments state that Russia has structurally militarized its economy, dedicating roughly 38–41% of federal spending to defence, regenerating military power, and pairing this with persistent hybrid tools such as cyber operations, espionage, and mapping of European critical infrastructure.
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service annual report describes Russian hybrid warfare using covert diplomacy, recruitment of foreign fighters for operations in Moldova and Ukraine, influence operations aimed at replacing Armenia’s leadership, sanctions-evasion networks using GRU-linked front companies, and large-scale unmanned systems procurement supported by Iran and North Korea.
OSINT investigations provided detailed mapping of Russian GRU Information Operations Troops infrastructure and exposed a Kremlin Presidential Directorate using cultural and media projects in post-Soviet states, Africa, and Central Asia as cover for espionage, recruitment, and election interference, including cooperation with sanctioned proxies in Moldova.
Law-enforcement actions in Poland, Estonia, Greece, and Lithuania show Belarusian and Russian services allegedly using residents in EU and NATO countries to reconnoitre critical infrastructure and prepare targeted killings of dissidents and political advisers, with some cases involving multi-year surveillance and suspected hacking.
Cybersecurity sources report a suspected Russian state-backed cyber intrusion against top-level German government officials, aiming to compromise sensitive communications and data, alongside documented Russian propaganda campaigns that inject millions of articles into global information space to shape both human perception and AI model outputs.
Key Incidents
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service annual report describes a comprehensive Russian hybrid warfare posture, including covert diplomatic activity used for espionage, recruitment of foreign combatants for operations in Moldova and Ukraine, efforts to unseat Armenia’s leadership through influence operations, deployment of FSB-linked information control tools, sanctions-evasion networks fronting for GRU interests, and accelerated unmanned systems buildup supported by Iranian and North Korean military supplies.Estonian intelligence report details Russia's multifaceted hybrid warfare involving espionage, influence campaigns, vio…
A comparative study of Nordic and Baltic intelligence assessments concludes that Russia has structurally militarized its economy, devoting around 38–41% of federal spending to defence and pairing this with sustained hybrid activities such as cyberattacks, espionage via recruited intermediaries, GPS interference, and systematic mapping of critical infrastructure across northern Europe.Nordic and Baltic intelligence reports from February 2026 reveal Russia's structural militarization and persistent, nor…
Investigative reporting details how Russia’s new Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, led by Vadim Titov, runs cultural and media projects in post-Soviet states and further abroad as covers for espionage, recruitment, election interference, and propaganda, including cooperation with FSB-linked personnel and sanctioned Moldovan politician Ilan Shor.In August 2025, Putin replaced a Kremlin soft power directorate with a new body under Vadim Titov, continuing espionage…
Greek authorities detained a local citizen and approved extradition over suspicion of financing and supporting a Russia-linked network that allegedly planned assassinations of a Russian activist granted asylum in Lithuania and a Lithuanian political adviser, using cross-border surveillance, tracking devices, and possible hacking; a linked case in Lithuania describes the same network’s foiled assassination plans.A Greek citizen detained in Thessaloniki for allegedly aiding a Russia-linked assassination plot targeting a Russian ac…
Analyst Overview
Open-source reporting this week depicts a broad Russian-led hybrid warfare environment combining structural military buildup, intelligence use of residents in NATO states, and large-scale information operations targeting both traditional media and AI systems. Northern European intelligence services describe Russia allocating around 40% of federal spending to defence and preparing for long-term confrontation with Europe, while Estonia and Poland report concrete counterintelligence cases involving suspected Russian and Belarusian assets. Investigations map GRU information operations units and Kremlin influence structures that use cultural and media projects for espionage and election interference, and DFRLab details a Pravda-branded content network designed to pollute AI training data. A suspected Russian state-backed cyber operation against senior German officials illustrates ongoing efforts to access sensitive political decision-making channels inside NATO states.
Use of residents, dual nationals, and intermediaries in NATO and EU states by Russian and Belarusian intelligence services for reconnaissance of critical infrastructure, border regions, and political targets.
Blending of cultural diplomacy, media projects, and nominally educational or peace-oriented initiatives with covert tasks such as recruitment, espionage, and election interference by Russian state-linked structures.
Targeting of senior political leadership and governmental communications by suspected Russian state-backed cyber intrusions to obtain sensitive information and potential leverage.
Strategic manipulation of the information environment through mass-produced propaganda, including efforts to embed Russian narratives into AI training datasets and widely used online platforms.
Reliance on front companies, sanctions-evasion networks, and foreign military supply relationships to sustain Russian defence production and unmanned systems buildup.
Growing role of OSINT, investigative media, and civil-society actors in uncovering Russian hybrid warfare infrastructure, from GRU information units to Wagner-linked facilities and covert influence directorates.
Coverage Gaps
Public sources provide limited technical and operational detail on the suspected Russian cyber intrusion into German government systems, including entry vectors, tools used, duration of access, and concrete impact on policy processes.
The precise command structures, tasking procedures, and active operations of the GRU Information Operations Troops remain largely unknown despite new structural mapping from open sources.
Open reporting on the Russian Pravda-branded content network does not fully clarify its funding streams, technical coordination mechanisms, or formal links to specific Russian state organs, nor which commercial AI systems are most affected.
Authorities have not disclosed full information on the size, composition, and direction of the networks implicated in the alleged assassination plots targeting individuals in Lithuania, including which Russian services, if any, exercised operational control.
The legal outcomes, evidentiary standards, and intelligence tradecraft involved in recent arrests and deportations of suspected Russian and Belarusian assets in Estonia, Poland, Greece, and Lithuania are only partially reported, limiting assessment of network depth and deterrent effect.
The cause of the SwePol undersea power cable outage between Poland and Sweden is still publicly unknown, with no detailed technical findings or attribution released.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
Defense Prep sectionFinalCurrent14 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Poland approved a 2025–2039 Armed Forces Development Program aimed at fielding roughly 300,000 active personnel and 200,000 reservists, backed by defence spending above 4 percent of GDP and possible constitutional guarantees, shifting NATO’s eastern land posture toward a mass, attrition-capable army structure.
The Hedgehog 2025 exercise in Estonia, using Ukraine’s Delta command system and Ukrainian drone units, reportedly showed that NATO battalion-sized forces became combat-ineffective within a day under Ukraine-style drone-saturated reconnaissance-strike conditions, indicating serious survivability and doctrinal gaps.
The European Commission issued a dedicated Action Plan on malicious drone use and a broader Drone Action Plan with around €400 million for drones and counter-drone systems, an EU-wide drone register, and a planned counter-drone competence centre by 2027, with specific measures to address high-altitude balloons affecting Lithuania.
Baltic and German authorities reported hostile activity by Russian and Belarusian services: Poland attributed large-scale cyberattacks on its energy sector to Russia, Lithuania’s security service exposed a Belarusian KGB YouTube recruitment attempt, and Germany’s Defence Ministry restricted personal devices in sensitive Bundeswehr spaces due to Russian and Chinese espionage threats.
Lithuanian and Finnish actors are rapidly testing and fielding unmanned systems and payloads for harsh-weather and unconventional tasks, including a Lithuanian night-vision drone sensor for tracking smuggling balloons and Finnish cold-weather trials of unmanned ground systems.
Key Incidents
Poland approved a long-term Armed Forces Development Program through 2039 to build a mass army of approximately 300,000 active troops plus 200,000 reservists, alongside defence spending set above 4 percent of GDP and a plan to anchor this level constitutionally, representing a major conventional buildup on NATO’s eastern flank aimed at sustained, high-intensity land warfare.Poland plans to expand its armed forces massively to 300,000 troops by 2039, reshaping NATO’s eastern flank with a focu…
In Estonia’s Hedgehog 2025 exercise, NATO ground units using Ukraine’s Delta battlefield-management system and training with Ukrainian drone teams were assessed as combat-ineffective within about 24 hours under dense unmanned surveillance and rapid strikes, exposing major vulnerabilities in NATO ground-force tactics, dispersion, and protection against drone-centric warfare.
The European Commission announced a Drone Action Plan that allocates roughly €400 million for EU states to procure drones and counter-drone systems, establishes an EU-wide drone register, and foresees a counter-drone competence centre by 2027, while also launching an EU hackathon on detecting and neutralising high-altitude balloons that have disrupted Lithuanian airports and are associated with Belarus-linked smuggling.The European Commission announced a Drone Action Plan including a European hackathon to develop countermeasures against…
The European Commission issued a specific Action Plan on malicious drone use that frames drones as a priority threat to critical infrastructure and public spaces and calls on member states to expand detection networks, mitigation tools, and cross-border coordination mechanisms, moving toward a more structured EU security posture on unmanned aircraft.
Analyst Overview
NATO frontline states, especially Poland and the Baltic region, are preparing more explicitly for large-scale, high-intensity conflict with Russia by expanding force structures, stress-testing ground forces, and hardening against cyber and intelligence threats. European institutions are moving to build a coordinated counter-drone and counter-balloon architecture and are discussing offensive cyber capabilities, while national militaries tighten counterintelligence measures. Baltic actors are also adapting quickly to unconventional threats such as smuggling or hybrid-use balloons and online recruitment attempts attributed to Belarusian and Russian services. Overall, the week shows a convergence of conventional force buildup with rapid adaptation to unmanned, cyber, and information-warfare environments on NATO’s eastern flank.
Mass-army, high-intensity war planning on NATO’s eastern flank, with Poland as the main driver of expanded active and reserve forces and long-term funding commitments.
Operational learning from Ukraine’s drone-centric warfare, including the use of Ukrainian systems and units in NATO exercises to expose vulnerabilities in Western ground-force posture.
Institutionalisation of EU-level counter-drone and drone-governance measures, spanning security, civil aviation, and AI regulation.
Expansion of European cyber posture discussions from defence to potential offensive capabilities, including at senior EU political levels.
Tighter counterintelligence and public-protection measures against Russian and Belarusian espionage, cyber activity, and recruitment in frontline states and major NATO militaries.
Rapid, bottom-up technical innovation in unmanned and sensor payloads for border security, harsh-weather operations, and detection of unconventional aerial platforms.
Coverage Gaps
Detailed force-structure design, equipment priorities, and intermediate milestones for Poland’s 2025–2039 Armed Forces Development Program are not specified, limiting assessment of actual warfighting capacity gains.
Follow-on decisions by NATO militaries after the Hedgehog 2025 findings, such as concrete doctrinal changes, dispersion standards, or survivability investments against drones, are unknown.
The technical performance requirements, procurement roadmap, and allocation criteria for the EU’s funded counter-drone and counter-balloon systems under the Drone Action Plan are not described.
Institutional responsibility, rules of engagement, and legal frameworks for the offensive cyber capabilities advocated at EU level are unclear, including how they would interact with national authorities.
For the Russian-attributed cyberattacks on Polish energy infrastructure, there is no available technical detail on attack vectors, malware families, or forensic indicators to validate or scope the operation.
The scale, frequency, and precise origin of smuggling and high-altitude balloons affecting Lithuanian airspace, and whether they are centrally directed or opportunistic, are not quantified.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service annual report describes Russian hybrid warfare using covert diplomacy, recruitment of foreign fighters for operations in Moldova and Ukraine, influence operations aimed at replacing Armenia’s leadership, sanctions-evasion networks using GRU-linked front companies, and large-scale unmanned systems procurement supported by Iran and North Korea.
OSINT investigations provided detailed mapping of Russian GRU Information Operations Troops infrastructure and exposed a Kremlin Presidential Directorate using cultural and media projects in post-Soviet states, Africa, and Central Asia as cover for espionage, recruitment, and election interference, including cooperation with sanctioned proxies in Moldova.
Law-enforcement actions in Poland, Estonia, Greece, and Lithuania show Belarusian and Russian services allegedly using residents in EU and NATO countries to reconnoitre critical infrastructure and prepare targeted killings of dissidents and political advisers, with some cases involving multi-year surveillance and suspected hacking.
Cybersecurity sources report a suspected Russian state-backed cyber intrusion against top-level German government officials, aiming to compromise sensitive communications and data, alongside documented Russian propaganda campaigns that inject millions of articles into global information space to shape both human perception and AI model outputs.
Key Incidents
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service annual report describes a comprehensive Russian hybrid warfare posture, including covert diplomatic activity used for espionage, recruitment of foreign combatants for operations in Moldova and Ukraine, efforts to unseat Armenia’s leadership through influence operations, deployment of FSB-linked information control tools, sanctions-evasion networks fronting for GRU interests, and accelerated unmanned systems buildup supported by Iranian and North Korean military supplies.Estonian intelligence report details Russia's multifaceted hybrid warfare involving espionage, influence campaigns, vio…
A comparative study of Nordic and Baltic intelligence assessments concludes that Russia has structurally militarized its economy, devoting around 38–41% of federal spending to defence and pairing this with sustained hybrid activities such as cyberattacks, espionage via recruited intermediaries, GPS interference, and systematic mapping of critical infrastructure across northern Europe.Nordic and Baltic intelligence reports from February 2026 reveal Russia's structural militarization and persistent, nor…
Investigative reporting details how Russia’s new Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, led by Vadim Titov, runs cultural and media projects in post-Soviet states and further abroad as covers for espionage, recruitment, election interference, and propaganda, including cooperation with FSB-linked personnel and sanctioned Moldovan politician Ilan Shor.In August 2025, Putin replaced a Kremlin soft power directorate with a new body under Vadim Titov, continuing espionage…
Greek authorities detained a local citizen and approved extradition over suspicion of financing and supporting a Russia-linked network that allegedly planned assassinations of a Russian activist granted asylum in Lithuania and a Lithuanian political adviser, using cross-border surveillance, tracking devices, and possible hacking; a linked case in Lithuania describes the same network’s foiled assassination plans.A Greek citizen detained in Thessaloniki for allegedly aiding a Russia-linked assassination plot targeting a Russian ac…
Analyst Overview
Open-source reporting this week depicts a broad Russian-led hybrid warfare environment combining structural military buildup, intelligence use of residents in NATO states, and large-scale information operations targeting both traditional media and AI systems. Northern European intelligence services describe Russia allocating around 40% of federal spending to defence and preparing for long-term confrontation with Europe, while Estonia and Poland report concrete counterintelligence cases involving suspected Russian and Belarusian assets. Investigations map GRU information operations units and Kremlin influence structures that use cultural and media projects for espionage and election interference, and DFRLab details a Pravda-branded content network designed to pollute AI training data. A suspected Russian state-backed cyber operation against senior German officials illustrates ongoing efforts to access sensitive political decision-making channels inside NATO states.
Use of residents, dual nationals, and intermediaries in NATO and EU states by Russian and Belarusian intelligence services for reconnaissance of critical infrastructure, border regions, and political targets.
Blending of cultural diplomacy, media projects, and nominally educational or peace-oriented initiatives with covert tasks such as recruitment, espionage, and election interference by Russian state-linked structures.
Targeting of senior political leadership and governmental communications by suspected Russian state-backed cyber intrusions to obtain sensitive information and potential leverage.
Strategic manipulation of the information environment through mass-produced propaganda, including efforts to embed Russian narratives into AI training datasets and widely used online platforms.
Reliance on front companies, sanctions-evasion networks, and foreign military supply relationships to sustain Russian defence production and unmanned systems buildup.
Growing role of OSINT, investigative media, and civil-society actors in uncovering Russian hybrid warfare infrastructure, from GRU information units to Wagner-linked facilities and covert influence directorates.
Coverage Gaps
Public sources provide limited technical and operational detail on the suspected Russian cyber intrusion into German government systems, including entry vectors, tools used, duration of access, and concrete impact on policy processes.
The precise command structures, tasking procedures, and active operations of the GRU Information Operations Troops remain largely unknown despite new structural mapping from open sources.
Open reporting on the Russian Pravda-branded content network does not fully clarify its funding streams, technical coordination mechanisms, or formal links to specific Russian state organs, nor which commercial AI systems are most affected.
Authorities have not disclosed full information on the size, composition, and direction of the networks implicated in the alleged assassination plots targeting individuals in Lithuania, including which Russian services, if any, exercised operational control.
The legal outcomes, evidentiary standards, and intelligence tradecraft involved in recent arrests and deportations of suspected Russian and Belarusian assets in Estonia, Poland, Greece, and Lithuania are only partially reported, limiting assessment of network depth and deterrent effect.
The cause of the SwePol undersea power cable outage between Poland and Sweden is still publicly unknown, with no detailed technical findings or attribution released.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
Defense Prep sectionFinalCurrent14 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Poland approved a 2025–2039 Armed Forces Development Program aimed at fielding roughly 300,000 active personnel and 200,000 reservists, backed by defence spending above 4 percent of GDP and possible constitutional guarantees, shifting NATO’s eastern land posture toward a mass, attrition-capable army structure.
The Hedgehog 2025 exercise in Estonia, using Ukraine’s Delta command system and Ukrainian drone units, reportedly showed that NATO battalion-sized forces became combat-ineffective within a day under Ukraine-style drone-saturated reconnaissance-strike conditions, indicating serious survivability and doctrinal gaps.
The European Commission issued a dedicated Action Plan on malicious drone use and a broader Drone Action Plan with around €400 million for drones and counter-drone systems, an EU-wide drone register, and a planned counter-drone competence centre by 2027, with specific measures to address high-altitude balloons affecting Lithuania.
Baltic and German authorities reported hostile activity by Russian and Belarusian services: Poland attributed large-scale cyberattacks on its energy sector to Russia, Lithuania’s security service exposed a Belarusian KGB YouTube recruitment attempt, and Germany’s Defence Ministry restricted personal devices in sensitive Bundeswehr spaces due to Russian and Chinese espionage threats.
Lithuanian and Finnish actors are rapidly testing and fielding unmanned systems and payloads for harsh-weather and unconventional tasks, including a Lithuanian night-vision drone sensor for tracking smuggling balloons and Finnish cold-weather trials of unmanned ground systems.
Key Incidents
Poland approved a long-term Armed Forces Development Program through 2039 to build a mass army of approximately 300,000 active troops plus 200,000 reservists, alongside defence spending set above 4 percent of GDP and a plan to anchor this level constitutionally, representing a major conventional buildup on NATO’s eastern flank aimed at sustained, high-intensity land warfare.Poland plans to expand its armed forces massively to 300,000 troops by 2039, reshaping NATO’s eastern flank with a focu…
In Estonia’s Hedgehog 2025 exercise, NATO ground units using Ukraine’s Delta battlefield-management system and training with Ukrainian drone teams were assessed as combat-ineffective within about 24 hours under dense unmanned surveillance and rapid strikes, exposing major vulnerabilities in NATO ground-force tactics, dispersion, and protection against drone-centric warfare.
The European Commission announced a Drone Action Plan that allocates roughly €400 million for EU states to procure drones and counter-drone systems, establishes an EU-wide drone register, and foresees a counter-drone competence centre by 2027, while also launching an EU hackathon on detecting and neutralising high-altitude balloons that have disrupted Lithuanian airports and are associated with Belarus-linked smuggling.The European Commission announced a Drone Action Plan including a European hackathon to develop countermeasures against…
The European Commission issued a specific Action Plan on malicious drone use that frames drones as a priority threat to critical infrastructure and public spaces and calls on member states to expand detection networks, mitigation tools, and cross-border coordination mechanisms, moving toward a more structured EU security posture on unmanned aircraft.
Analyst Overview
NATO frontline states, especially Poland and the Baltic region, are preparing more explicitly for large-scale, high-intensity conflict with Russia by expanding force structures, stress-testing ground forces, and hardening against cyber and intelligence threats. European institutions are moving to build a coordinated counter-drone and counter-balloon architecture and are discussing offensive cyber capabilities, while national militaries tighten counterintelligence measures. Baltic actors are also adapting quickly to unconventional threats such as smuggling or hybrid-use balloons and online recruitment attempts attributed to Belarusian and Russian services. Overall, the week shows a convergence of conventional force buildup with rapid adaptation to unmanned, cyber, and information-warfare environments on NATO’s eastern flank.
Mass-army, high-intensity war planning on NATO’s eastern flank, with Poland as the main driver of expanded active and reserve forces and long-term funding commitments.
Operational learning from Ukraine’s drone-centric warfare, including the use of Ukrainian systems and units in NATO exercises to expose vulnerabilities in Western ground-force posture.
Institutionalisation of EU-level counter-drone and drone-governance measures, spanning security, civil aviation, and AI regulation.
Expansion of European cyber posture discussions from defence to potential offensive capabilities, including at senior EU political levels.
Tighter counterintelligence and public-protection measures against Russian and Belarusian espionage, cyber activity, and recruitment in frontline states and major NATO militaries.
Rapid, bottom-up technical innovation in unmanned and sensor payloads for border security, harsh-weather operations, and detection of unconventional aerial platforms.
Coverage Gaps
Detailed force-structure design, equipment priorities, and intermediate milestones for Poland’s 2025–2039 Armed Forces Development Program are not specified, limiting assessment of actual warfighting capacity gains.
Follow-on decisions by NATO militaries after the Hedgehog 2025 findings, such as concrete doctrinal changes, dispersion standards, or survivability investments against drones, are unknown.
The technical performance requirements, procurement roadmap, and allocation criteria for the EU’s funded counter-drone and counter-balloon systems under the Drone Action Plan are not described.
Institutional responsibility, rules of engagement, and legal frameworks for the offensive cyber capabilities advocated at EU level are unclear, including how they would interact with national authorities.
For the Russian-attributed cyberattacks on Polish energy infrastructure, there is no available technical detail on attack vectors, malware families, or forensic indicators to validate or scope the operation.
The scale, frequency, and precise origin of smuggling and high-altitude balloons affecting Lithuanian airspace, and whether they are centrally directed or opportunistic, are not quantified.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
Lithuania’s State Security Department publicly warned that Belarusian KGB officers were using a Lithuanian-language YouTube video to recruit agents by appealing to anti-government sentiment and offering a supposed secure channel, described this as hostile-state activity, and urged citizens to report any such contacts, illustrating overt public counter-HUMINT messaging against Belarusian and Russian services.Lithuania’s State Security Department (VSD) warns of an alleged Belarus KGB recruitment attempt via a Lithuanian-langua…
Lithuania’s State Security Department publicly warned that Belarusian KGB officers were using a Lithuanian-language YouTube video to recruit agents by appealing to anti-government sentiment and offering a supposed secure channel, described this as hostile-state activity, and urged citizens to report any such contacts, illustrating overt public counter-HUMINT messaging against Belarusian and Russian services.Lithuania’s State Security Department (VSD) warns of an alleged Belarus KGB recruitment attempt via a Lithuanian-langua…