Hybrid and Defense Preparations are shown as separate sections for the same week. If one scope is unavailable, the gap stays visible instead of being folded into the other narrative.
Hybrid readyDefense Prep readyNov 10 – November 16, 202523 signals at generation
This briefing is a point-in-time summary built from open-source signals that were automatically processed and have not undergone individual human editorial review. Later signals are not retroactively included. Some details may be unverified.
Scope coverage
One weekly brief bundle with separate Hybrid and Defense Preparations sections. Missing sections stay visible so coverage gaps are obvious.
The current section is the brief you opened; the other pill jumps to the sibling scope for the same week.
Hybrid section
Hybrid sectionFinalCurrent13 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Poland reports multiple acts of rail sabotage on the Warsaw–Lublin corridor in November, attributes them to Ukrainian nationals allegedly long-run by Russian intelligence via Belarus, and labels one explosion that damaged tracks near Mika as state terrorism, while closing Russia’s consulate in Gdansk and deploying around 10,000 troops under Operation Horizont to protect critical infrastructure.
Hybrid and Defense Preparations are shown as separate sections for the same week. If one scope is unavailable, the gap stays visible instead of being folded into the other narrative.
Hybrid readyDefense Prep readyNov 10 – November 16, 202523 signals at generation
This briefing is a point-in-time summary built from open-source signals that were automatically processed and have not undergone individual human editorial review. Later signals are not retroactively included. Some details may be unverified.
Scope coverage
One weekly brief bundle with separate Hybrid and Defense Preparations sections. Missing sections stay visible so coverage gaps are obvious.
The current section is the brief you opened; the other pill jumps to the sibling scope for the same week.
Hybrid section
Hybrid sectionFinalCurrent13 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Poland reports multiple acts of rail sabotage on the Warsaw–Lublin corridor in November, attributes them to Ukrainian nationals allegedly long-run by Russian intelligence via Belarus, and labels one explosion that damaged tracks near Mika as state terrorism, while closing Russia’s consulate in Gdansk and deploying around 10,000 troops under Operation Horizont to protect critical infrastructure.
Vilnius says high‑altitude contraband balloons launched from Belarusian military border zones are entering Lithuanian airspace on a near‑daily basis using GPS trackers tied to Lithuanian, Polish, and Latvian SIM cards, repeatedly forcing temporary flight restrictions over Vilnius and Kaunas and assessed by Lithuanian armed forces and border guards as a hybrid threat involving Belarusian state structures and criminal groups.
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany record unexplained drone activity over a nuclear power plant, airports, NATO command facilities, and industrial sites, with German and other European officials explicitly linking the pattern to Russian intimidation related to frozen Russian assets and prompting British counter‑drone assistance, NATO surveillance flights, and EU planning for a counter‑drone ‘wall’.
Romania again finds suspected Russian drone fragments from strikes on Ukrainian Danube ports on its territory near Grindu, about five kilometres from the border, which its president describes as accidental but which illustrates physical spillover of Russian weapons onto NATO soil during a wider surge of drone‑related incidents in Europe.
In the information and cyber domains, a Russian national is detained in Krakow for alleged cyberattacks against Polish and EU firms, and the Institute for the Study of War confirms an illicit edit to its Ukraine war map that falsely awarded Russia a territorial gain just before a large online bet on that outcome was settled, raising concerns about financially and potentially state‑driven manipulation of trusted OSINT products.
Key Incidents
On 10 November an explosive device damaged tracks on the Warsaw–Lublin rail line near Mika, a key logistics route for Ukraine; Poland publicly blamed Russian intelligence, called the act state terrorism, ordered the closure of Russia’s consulate in Gdansk, deployed about 10,000 soldiers to guard critical infrastructure under Operation Horizont, and expanded intelligence and rail security cooperation with Ukraine.Poland closed its last Russian consulate in Gdansk after a November 2025 sabotage attack on a strategic railway line, w…
Poland attributes two November rail sabotage incidents, including a 15 November freight train bombing attempt near Malko, to two Ukrainian nationals it says had long worked for Russian intelligence after entering from Belarus, assessing their goal as causing a rail catastrophe, disrupting Ukraine‑bound supply lines, and fuelling anti‑Ukrainian sentiment inside Poland.Polish PM Donald Tusk says two Ukrainians working for Russia were behind sabotage on Poland's rail network in November…
Warsaw formally requested that Belarus extradite two named Ukrainian citizens accused of planting a military explosive and steel clamps on the Warsaw–Lublin railway and of previous coordination with Russian intelligence and a GRU officer, linking the Polish sabotage case to networks operating from Belarus and to earlier attempted attacks in Ukraine.Poland seeks extradition from Belarus of two Ukrainians accused of Russian-backed sabotage on Polish railways.
Lithuania reports near‑daily high‑altitude contraband balloons launched from Belarusian military border zones carrying cigarettes and equipped with GPS trackers and Lithuanian, Polish, and Latvian SIM cards, which have repeatedly forced temporary flight restrictions at Vilnius and Kaunas and are described by Lithuanian armed forces and border guards as a Belarusian state‑enabled hybrid threat.Since late 2024, Belarusian smugglers have launched GPS-tracked cigarette balloons into Lithuania using Lithuanian SIM…
At least three unidentified drones flew over Belgium’s Doel nuclear power plant after earlier drone incidents had already closed airports in Belgium and Germany; senior European officials, including Germany’s defence minister, publicly link these incursions to Russian intimidation over frozen Russian assets, leading to UK counter‑drone assistance for Belgium, NATO surveillance flights, and EU work on a region‑wide counter‑drone barrier.Multiple drones were sighted over the Doel nuclear plant in Belgium on Nov 10, 2025, amid a wave of mysterious drone in…
An unauthorized edit of the Institute for the Study of War’s interactive Ukraine conflict map briefly showed a Russian advance into Myrnohrad just before a high‑value Polymarket bet on that outcome was settled, before ISW detected and reversed the change and warned against use of its products for betting, illustrating how open conflict data can be manipulated for financial or influence purposes.On Nov 15, 2025, an unauthorized edit of ISW's Ukraine conflict map falsely showed Russian capture of Myrnohrad, enabli…
Analyst Overview
Reporting this week points to a concentrated pattern of Russian and Belarusian-linked hybrid activity against NATO states, combining physical sabotage of Polish rail infrastructure, deniable airspace incursions over European critical sites, and information and cyber operations. Polish authorities directly accuse Russian intelligence of sponsoring attempts to derail trains on a key supply corridor to Ukraine, while Lithuania, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Romania confront unexplained drones and high-altitude smuggling balloons affecting nuclear, military, and aviation assets. Parallel efforts in cyberspace and the information domain include alleged Russian hacking against EU commercial platforms and manipulation of trusted conflict-mapping outputs at a financially sensitive moment. NATO members are responding with troop deployments, counter‑drone cooperation, and diplomatic steps against Russia and Belarus, but attribution and command structures behind several activities remain only partly documented in open sources.
Targeting of NATO logistics and transport infrastructure through sabotage and explosives, especially rail lines used to move military and humanitarian supplies into Ukraine.
Use of small drones, balloons, and other unmanned platforms for deniable incursions over NATO critical infrastructure, nuclear facilities, airports, and military commands, complicating airspace security and attribution.
Blurring of criminal smuggling with state-enabled hybrid pressure, as seen in Belarus-based contraband balloon operations that disrupt Lithuanian civil aviation and are assessed to require Belarusian official involvement.
Exploitation and manipulation of information systems and open-source analytical products, including conflict maps and commercial IT platforms, for financial gain and potentially for influence operations linked to the Russia–Ukraine war.
Reliance on neighbouring allied or client states, especially Belarus and Serbia, as operational depth for Russian hybrid tools ranging from sabotage networks to economic and political influence.
NATO and EU member responses that combine military deployments, counter‑drone cooperation, law-enforcement investigations, and diplomatic measures such as consulate closures and extradition requests.
Coverage Gaps
Law-enforcement and technical investigations have not publicly identified the operators, launch sites, or command structures behind drone incursions over Belgian and Dutch critical infrastructure and the nuclear facility at Doel, despite political statements accusing Russia.
Public sources provide limited detail on the specific Russian intelligence units, tasking chains, or funding lines behind the Polish rail sabotage cases, beyond general references to Russian intelligence and a GRU officer.
Open reporting does not clarify how Belarusian authorities have treated the two Ukrainian suspects who allegedly fled there after the Polish rail attacks, nor Belarus’s formal response to Poland’s extradition request.
The extent and nature of any Russian state involvement in the Belarus-based contraband balloon launches into Lithuania is unknown, including which Belarusian agencies authorize flights and how profits are shared with criminal groups.
The identity, access route, and motivation of the actor who tampered with ISW’s online map have not been disclosed, and there is no public evidence on whether the edit was purely financially motivated, coordinated with state actors, or linked to a broader campaign.
Polish authorities have not publicly linked the detained Russian cyber suspect to Russian state structures or a wider coordinated hybrid operation, leaving uncertainty over whether these intrusions are part of a strategic campaign or primarily profit-driven crime.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
Defense Prep sectionFinalCurrent10 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Poland reported and investigated a significant sabotage attack on the Warsaw–Lublin rail line used for Ukraine aid, attributing it to Ukrainian citizens working for Russian intelligence, opening criminal cases, and closing Russia’s last consulate in Gdańsk while EU officials warned that EU transport infrastructure faces unprecedented risk.
Policy analysis assessed a five- to ten-fold increase in Russian GNSS jamming and spoofing from Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula, degrading navigation for an estimated 40% of European air traffic and prompting proposals for EU–NATO countermeasures including sanctions, shared RF monitoring, and better military–civil aviation coordination.
Lithuania linked recent Russian drones, aircraft incursions, and Belarus-launched smuggling balloons to plans for major air defence reinforcement funded by a record defence budget share, framing these steps within NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry and upcoming State Defence Council decisions.
Lithuania launched a rapid six‑month innovation and procurement drive with domestic industry to field new detection and neutralisation systems against drones and balloons that have already disrupted Vilnius Airport, seeking to close low‑altitude airspace gaps with scalable, low-cost technologies.
Bosnian prosecutors requested Moldovan assistance in probing alleged Russian‑run paramilitary training camps in Republika Srpska for Moldovan citizens, while EU institutions advanced a package to protect elections and media from Russian hybrid operations through tighter platform regulation, cyber measures, and support for independent media.
A policy study reported a five- to ten-fold surge in Russian GNSS jamming and spoofing from military sites in Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula, estimated to affect about 40% of European air traffic in some periods, and recommended joint EU–NATO legal, political, and technical responses including sanctions expansion, integrated EW support, and shared RF monitoring for aviation safety.
Analyst Overview
Russian-attributed hybrid activity this week focused on degrading European critical infrastructure and airspace security, while EU and NATO states accelerated defensive measures. Poland faced a major rail sabotage case affecting Ukraine aid routes, Lithuania moved to harden its airspace against drones and balloons, and analysis pointed to large-scale Russian GNSS interference affecting European aviation. EU institutions advanced protective measures for elections and media, and Bosnian authorities examined alleged Russian paramilitary training for proxy operations against Moldova.
Russian state and proxy operations against EU critical infrastructure, including transport corridors used to support Ukraine, are pushing NATO and EU actors toward structural measures such as streamlined military mobility and hardening of key nodes.
Baltic airspace defence is shifting toward layered solutions against low-cost aerial threats, combining traditional air defence reinforcement with rapid counter-UAV and counter-balloon capabilities developed through domestic innovation ecosystems.
GNSS interference used as a tool of military pressure is emerging as a pan-European aviation and defence concern, blurring lines between peacetime safety and conflict-related electronic warfare.
Russian-linked paramilitary and influence networks are using training, organisational support, and drone skills to prepare foreign nationals for destabilisation efforts against pro‑EU governments.
EU-level policy is framing information integrity and electoral security as defence preparedness issues, integrating legal, regulatory, and technical tools to counter Russian hybrid attacks.
Coverage Gaps
Technical parameters of Russian GNSS jamming and spoofing—such as specific systems, emission power, and operating patterns—are not publicly detailed, limiting precise assessment of military versus civilian targeting and escalation thresholds.
Lithuania’s planned air defence and counter‑drone/balloon systems are described without specifics on sensor types, effectors, command-and-control integration with NATO assets, or rules of engagement over populated areas and civilian infrastructure.
Public information on the Polish rail sabotage focuses on government statements and early prosecutorial actions; independent forensic data, confirmed chains of command into Russian services, and evidence of Belarusian state involvement beyond acting as a safe haven are not available.
The alleged Russian‑run training camps in Republika Srpska are still under investigation, with no public clarity on the number of trainees, duration and frequency of courses, or confirmed operational deployments of graduates outside Moldova.
Details of the EU’s election and media protection measures, including implementation timelines, member state resourcing, operational roles for existing cyber and hybrid threat bodies, and enforcement mechanisms for non-compliant platforms, are not yet specified.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
Vilnius says high‑altitude contraband balloons launched from Belarusian military border zones are entering Lithuanian airspace on a near‑daily basis using GPS trackers tied to Lithuanian, Polish, and Latvian SIM cards, repeatedly forcing temporary flight restrictions over Vilnius and Kaunas and assessed by Lithuanian armed forces and border guards as a hybrid threat involving Belarusian state structures and criminal groups.
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany record unexplained drone activity over a nuclear power plant, airports, NATO command facilities, and industrial sites, with German and other European officials explicitly linking the pattern to Russian intimidation related to frozen Russian assets and prompting British counter‑drone assistance, NATO surveillance flights, and EU planning for a counter‑drone ‘wall’.
Romania again finds suspected Russian drone fragments from strikes on Ukrainian Danube ports on its territory near Grindu, about five kilometres from the border, which its president describes as accidental but which illustrates physical spillover of Russian weapons onto NATO soil during a wider surge of drone‑related incidents in Europe.
In the information and cyber domains, a Russian national is detained in Krakow for alleged cyberattacks against Polish and EU firms, and the Institute for the Study of War confirms an illicit edit to its Ukraine war map that falsely awarded Russia a territorial gain just before a large online bet on that outcome was settled, raising concerns about financially and potentially state‑driven manipulation of trusted OSINT products.
Key Incidents
On 10 November an explosive device damaged tracks on the Warsaw–Lublin rail line near Mika, a key logistics route for Ukraine; Poland publicly blamed Russian intelligence, called the act state terrorism, ordered the closure of Russia’s consulate in Gdansk, deployed about 10,000 soldiers to guard critical infrastructure under Operation Horizont, and expanded intelligence and rail security cooperation with Ukraine.Poland closed its last Russian consulate in Gdansk after a November 2025 sabotage attack on a strategic railway line, w…
Poland attributes two November rail sabotage incidents, including a 15 November freight train bombing attempt near Malko, to two Ukrainian nationals it says had long worked for Russian intelligence after entering from Belarus, assessing their goal as causing a rail catastrophe, disrupting Ukraine‑bound supply lines, and fuelling anti‑Ukrainian sentiment inside Poland.Polish PM Donald Tusk says two Ukrainians working for Russia were behind sabotage on Poland's rail network in November…
Warsaw formally requested that Belarus extradite two named Ukrainian citizens accused of planting a military explosive and steel clamps on the Warsaw–Lublin railway and of previous coordination with Russian intelligence and a GRU officer, linking the Polish sabotage case to networks operating from Belarus and to earlier attempted attacks in Ukraine.Poland seeks extradition from Belarus of two Ukrainians accused of Russian-backed sabotage on Polish railways.
Lithuania reports near‑daily high‑altitude contraband balloons launched from Belarusian military border zones carrying cigarettes and equipped with GPS trackers and Lithuanian, Polish, and Latvian SIM cards, which have repeatedly forced temporary flight restrictions at Vilnius and Kaunas and are described by Lithuanian armed forces and border guards as a Belarusian state‑enabled hybrid threat.Since late 2024, Belarusian smugglers have launched GPS-tracked cigarette balloons into Lithuania using Lithuanian SIM…
At least three unidentified drones flew over Belgium’s Doel nuclear power plant after earlier drone incidents had already closed airports in Belgium and Germany; senior European officials, including Germany’s defence minister, publicly link these incursions to Russian intimidation over frozen Russian assets, leading to UK counter‑drone assistance for Belgium, NATO surveillance flights, and EU work on a region‑wide counter‑drone barrier.Multiple drones were sighted over the Doel nuclear plant in Belgium on Nov 10, 2025, amid a wave of mysterious drone in…
An unauthorized edit of the Institute for the Study of War’s interactive Ukraine conflict map briefly showed a Russian advance into Myrnohrad just before a high‑value Polymarket bet on that outcome was settled, before ISW detected and reversed the change and warned against use of its products for betting, illustrating how open conflict data can be manipulated for financial or influence purposes.On Nov 15, 2025, an unauthorized edit of ISW's Ukraine conflict map falsely showed Russian capture of Myrnohrad, enabli…
Analyst Overview
Reporting this week points to a concentrated pattern of Russian and Belarusian-linked hybrid activity against NATO states, combining physical sabotage of Polish rail infrastructure, deniable airspace incursions over European critical sites, and information and cyber operations. Polish authorities directly accuse Russian intelligence of sponsoring attempts to derail trains on a key supply corridor to Ukraine, while Lithuania, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Romania confront unexplained drones and high-altitude smuggling balloons affecting nuclear, military, and aviation assets. Parallel efforts in cyberspace and the information domain include alleged Russian hacking against EU commercial platforms and manipulation of trusted conflict-mapping outputs at a financially sensitive moment. NATO members are responding with troop deployments, counter‑drone cooperation, and diplomatic steps against Russia and Belarus, but attribution and command structures behind several activities remain only partly documented in open sources.
Targeting of NATO logistics and transport infrastructure through sabotage and explosives, especially rail lines used to move military and humanitarian supplies into Ukraine.
Use of small drones, balloons, and other unmanned platforms for deniable incursions over NATO critical infrastructure, nuclear facilities, airports, and military commands, complicating airspace security and attribution.
Blurring of criminal smuggling with state-enabled hybrid pressure, as seen in Belarus-based contraband balloon operations that disrupt Lithuanian civil aviation and are assessed to require Belarusian official involvement.
Exploitation and manipulation of information systems and open-source analytical products, including conflict maps and commercial IT platforms, for financial gain and potentially for influence operations linked to the Russia–Ukraine war.
Reliance on neighbouring allied or client states, especially Belarus and Serbia, as operational depth for Russian hybrid tools ranging from sabotage networks to economic and political influence.
NATO and EU member responses that combine military deployments, counter‑drone cooperation, law-enforcement investigations, and diplomatic measures such as consulate closures and extradition requests.
Coverage Gaps
Law-enforcement and technical investigations have not publicly identified the operators, launch sites, or command structures behind drone incursions over Belgian and Dutch critical infrastructure and the nuclear facility at Doel, despite political statements accusing Russia.
Public sources provide limited detail on the specific Russian intelligence units, tasking chains, or funding lines behind the Polish rail sabotage cases, beyond general references to Russian intelligence and a GRU officer.
Open reporting does not clarify how Belarusian authorities have treated the two Ukrainian suspects who allegedly fled there after the Polish rail attacks, nor Belarus’s formal response to Poland’s extradition request.
The extent and nature of any Russian state involvement in the Belarus-based contraband balloon launches into Lithuania is unknown, including which Belarusian agencies authorize flights and how profits are shared with criminal groups.
The identity, access route, and motivation of the actor who tampered with ISW’s online map have not been disclosed, and there is no public evidence on whether the edit was purely financially motivated, coordinated with state actors, or linked to a broader campaign.
Polish authorities have not publicly linked the detained Russian cyber suspect to Russian state structures or a wider coordinated hybrid operation, leaving uncertainty over whether these intrusions are part of a strategic campaign or primarily profit-driven crime.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
Defense Prep sectionFinalCurrent10 signals at generation
Sources: open-source, automated processing
Generated Nov 15, 2026
Executive Summary
Poland reported and investigated a significant sabotage attack on the Warsaw–Lublin rail line used for Ukraine aid, attributing it to Ukrainian citizens working for Russian intelligence, opening criminal cases, and closing Russia’s last consulate in Gdańsk while EU officials warned that EU transport infrastructure faces unprecedented risk.
Policy analysis assessed a five- to ten-fold increase in Russian GNSS jamming and spoofing from Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula, degrading navigation for an estimated 40% of European air traffic and prompting proposals for EU–NATO countermeasures including sanctions, shared RF monitoring, and better military–civil aviation coordination.
Lithuania linked recent Russian drones, aircraft incursions, and Belarus-launched smuggling balloons to plans for major air defence reinforcement funded by a record defence budget share, framing these steps within NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry and upcoming State Defence Council decisions.
Lithuania launched a rapid six‑month innovation and procurement drive with domestic industry to field new detection and neutralisation systems against drones and balloons that have already disrupted Vilnius Airport, seeking to close low‑altitude airspace gaps with scalable, low-cost technologies.
Bosnian prosecutors requested Moldovan assistance in probing alleged Russian‑run paramilitary training camps in Republika Srpska for Moldovan citizens, while EU institutions advanced a package to protect elections and media from Russian hybrid operations through tighter platform regulation, cyber measures, and support for independent media.
A policy study reported a five- to ten-fold surge in Russian GNSS jamming and spoofing from military sites in Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula, estimated to affect about 40% of European air traffic in some periods, and recommended joint EU–NATO legal, political, and technical responses including sanctions expansion, integrated EW support, and shared RF monitoring for aviation safety.
Analyst Overview
Russian-attributed hybrid activity this week focused on degrading European critical infrastructure and airspace security, while EU and NATO states accelerated defensive measures. Poland faced a major rail sabotage case affecting Ukraine aid routes, Lithuania moved to harden its airspace against drones and balloons, and analysis pointed to large-scale Russian GNSS interference affecting European aviation. EU institutions advanced protective measures for elections and media, and Bosnian authorities examined alleged Russian paramilitary training for proxy operations against Moldova.
Russian state and proxy operations against EU critical infrastructure, including transport corridors used to support Ukraine, are pushing NATO and EU actors toward structural measures such as streamlined military mobility and hardening of key nodes.
Baltic airspace defence is shifting toward layered solutions against low-cost aerial threats, combining traditional air defence reinforcement with rapid counter-UAV and counter-balloon capabilities developed through domestic innovation ecosystems.
GNSS interference used as a tool of military pressure is emerging as a pan-European aviation and defence concern, blurring lines between peacetime safety and conflict-related electronic warfare.
Russian-linked paramilitary and influence networks are using training, organisational support, and drone skills to prepare foreign nationals for destabilisation efforts against pro‑EU governments.
EU-level policy is framing information integrity and electoral security as defence preparedness issues, integrating legal, regulatory, and technical tools to counter Russian hybrid attacks.
Coverage Gaps
Technical parameters of Russian GNSS jamming and spoofing—such as specific systems, emission power, and operating patterns—are not publicly detailed, limiting precise assessment of military versus civilian targeting and escalation thresholds.
Lithuania’s planned air defence and counter‑drone/balloon systems are described without specifics on sensor types, effectors, command-and-control integration with NATO assets, or rules of engagement over populated areas and civilian infrastructure.
Public information on the Polish rail sabotage focuses on government statements and early prosecutorial actions; independent forensic data, confirmed chains of command into Russian services, and evidence of Belarusian state involvement beyond acting as a safe haven are not available.
The alleged Russian‑run training camps in Republika Srpska are still under investigation, with no public clarity on the number of trainees, duration and frequency of courses, or confirmed operational deployments of graduates outside Moldova.
Details of the EU’s election and media protection measures, including implementation timelines, member state resourcing, operational roles for existing cyber and hybrid threat bodies, and enforcement mechanisms for non-compliant platforms, are not yet specified.
Member Signals
Every signal cited in this section, for a navigable evidence trail.
Bosnian prosecutors investigated allegations that Russian instructors, including figures linked to Wagner-type structures, ran paramilitary training camps in Republika Srpska for Moldovan citizens, teaching protest organisation, police provocation, drone use, and Molotov cocktails for operations against Moldova’s pro‑EU government, indicating cross‑border preparation of proxy operatives.Bosnian prosecutors have asked Moldovan authorities for information on Russian-led training camps in Republika Srpska,…
Bosnian prosecutors investigated allegations that Russian instructors, including figures linked to Wagner-type structures, ran paramilitary training camps in Republika Srpska for Moldovan citizens, teaching protest organisation, police provocation, drone use, and Molotov cocktails for operations against Moldova’s pro‑EU government, indicating cross‑border preparation of proxy operatives.Bosnian prosecutors have asked Moldovan authorities for information on Russian-led training camps in Republika Srpska,…